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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the implementation of policy-prescribed pastoral land rights, and how 
actors at different levels influence the implementation process. More specifically, through six 
weeks of field research and extensive literature reviews, the thesis investigates why the 
implementation of pastoral land rights has stalled in Uganda’s mineral-rich Karamoja region. 
Focus is directed towards the factors that may be decisive in determining the absence of 
implementation and realization of pastoral land rights, and how the absence of enforced rights 
provides a window of opportunity for actors and institutions to benefit from land as a 
resource. Arguing that implementation of policy is a political process, influenced by actors at 
local, regional, national and international levels, the thesis combines the access-literature’s 
focus on the local level, with the land-grab-literature’s focus on political and economic forces 
at play in implementation. Based on this approach, the thesis establishes the overall argument 
that local struggles over access to land are inextricably linked to the political economy, and 
that the outcome of implementation of land reforms can only be explored through an 
analytical framework that includes a focus on the interconnections between actors at all 
analytical levels. In the example of Karamoja, we suggest that the implementation of pastoral 
land rights come to constitute what we could call a local ‘pocket of inefficiency,’ as mutual 
interests between actors in the mineral sector and the ruling coalition do not require 
implementation of land rights, but rather the opposite. !! ! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! !!!!! !
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis explores the implementation of legal efforts to secure pastoral land rights, and 
how actors working at different levels influence this process. Through an investigation of 
local struggles over access to land in Uganda’s mineral-rich Karamoja region, and of the role 
of land and minerals in the political economy, the thesis seeks to provide an understanding of 
why the implementation of pastoral land rights comes to a standstill. Such investigation 
cannot be done without linking the local implementation of pastoral land rights to dynamics 
pertaining to land and resource investments. !
The overall background for investigating socio-political struggles over land access and rights 
stems from the situation that what was once a resource in abundance on the African continent 
is now becoming an increasingly scarce and contested resource (Berry 2002; Toulmin 2009). 
This is caused by a variety of factors such as population growth, environmental degradation, 
and various forms of conflict. Moreover, what has popularly been labeled a global ‘land rush’ 
or ‘land-grab’ (Zoomers 2010; Arezki et al. 2011; Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Cotula 2012) 
– triggered by growing global demands for land and resources – has dispossessed local 
communities of the land on which they depend (GRAIN 2008; Zagema 2011; Wily 2012). 
What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is a need to look beyond the “immediately 
visible dynamics and practices” of the so-called land grab phenomenon (Kaag and Zoomers 
2014:1; Pedersen and Buur 2016). Simply analyzing land deals through the lens of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ or ‘accumulation by dispossession’, as it has popularly been done, may skew 
analyses of contemporary land acquisitions as the terms are ambiguously understood and fits 
poorly with the current heterogeneous definitions of land grabbing itself (Hall 2013). In order 
to do justice to the complexities of land and resource investments, the analytical perspective 
needs to focus on the interconnections between actors at different levels. Contemporary land 
reforms often entail tensions between facilitating land and resource investment and securing 
the land rights of local communities (Amanor 2012). Therefore, this thesis explores foreign, 
national, state, and non-state actors’ involvement in land and resource investments, and their 
motives and interrelations. How these different actors are interlinked is important in 
understanding the process and diverse outcomes of the implementation of land rights. 
Implementation of land rights is crucial to investigate, as it has tremendous consequences for 
the people whom it affects.   
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1.1. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND REFORMS IN UGANDA 
Implementation of land reforms has proved challenging across Africa (Pedersen 2013). While 
enormous energy has been devoted to generating the right policy models, little attention has 
been given to the processes that happen between policy prescriptions and implementation 
outcomes (Mosse 2004). The process of implementation is, in this regard, no less political 
and complex than policy formulation and similarly vulnerable to interference by different 
actors competing for control over policy implementation (Mosse 2004; Paudel 2009). In this 
way, government policies can be (ab)used by various actors to shore up claims and underpin 
authority. No land policy is left “unscathed” by implementation as different actors will 
accept, negotiate, or resist implementation of such policies according to their respective 
interests and power (Lund 2008:4; Lund and Boone 2013). As a result, attention needs be 
given to the dynamics and politics of tenure reform, and how land reforms are not only 
constituted through policy-formulation but also through local contestations as part of local 
institutional competition over authority and benefits (Thomas and Grindle 1990; Berry 2002; 
Sikor and Lund 2009; van Leeuwen 2014).!
In this thesis, Uganda is used as an example to illustrate how the implementation of land 
rights is a process affected by different actors at all levels who try to secure their interests 
within the land field. In Uganda, new land reforms have been made on the basis of the 1995 
Constitution, vesting all land in the hands of the Ugandan people (Constitution 1995). The 
government has introduced the 1998 Land Act and, later, the 2013 National Land Policy. The 
aim of these policy efforts have been to stimulate agricultural development, attract foreign 
investment, alleviate poverty, and protect and enhance the rights of women and marginalized 
groups (Land Act 1998; Land Policy 2013). The 1998 Land Act furthermore marked the first 
time in Ugandan history that customary tenure became formally recognized as part of the 
legal land framework (Land Act 1998; Pedersen et al. 2012). The Act provides communities 
with the ability to own land communally through the establishment of Communal Land 
Associations (CLA) and receiving Certificates of Customary Ownership (CCO).!
1.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF PASTORAL LAND RIGHTS IN KARAMOJA 
In Uganda’s Northeastern Karamoja region, (agro-)pastoralism continues to be the most 
viable form of livelihood (FEWS NET 2005; Levine 2010). The region, currently recovering 
from protracted years of conflict and instability, is the poorest region in Uganda with an 
estimated 75 percent of the population living below the poverty line (MoFPED 2014). 
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However, the newly installed peace is fraught with another challenge: the quest for land and 
minerals by domestic and foreign actors (Kabiswa et al. 2014; Human Rights Watch 2014). 
The region’s vulnerability and poverty have been exacerbated by a long and continuous 
history of land dispossession, anti-pastoral policies, and inappropriate development 
interventions dating back to colonial times (Mamdani 1982; Krätli 2010; Kagan et al. 2009). 
Policy interventions, having chronically favored agricultural transformation and disregarded 
pastoral lifestyles and needs (Mosebo 2015), have systematically undermined strategies of 
pastoral production, diverted assets, eroded entitlements, undermined customary institutions, 
and fostered and consolidated inequality (Mamdani 1982; Krätli 2010).!
Based on the challenges attributed to land and resource investments, and recognizing that 
“pastoral communities and ethnic minorities have registered exploitation for a long time”, the 
2013 Land Policy makes the objective of securing that, “[l]and rights of pastoral 
communities will be guaranteed and protected by the State” (Land Policy 2013:IIA,60). 
However, in spite of such official commitment to protecting pastoral communities and their 
rights, not a single communally held certificate of customary ownership has been issued in 
Karamoja. Coupled with a lack of staffing and institutional capacity, the implementation and 
enforcement of such policy commitment have effectively come to a standstill.!
This thesis seeks to investigate why the implementation of pastoral land rights comes to a 
standstill. Focus is directed at the factors that may be decisive in determining the absence of 
implementation and realization of pastoral land rights, and how the absence of enforced 
rights provides a window of opportunity for actors and institutions to benefit from land as a 
resource. Rooted within complex dynamics of implementation, this thesis seeks to address 
the following research question: 
 
How can we understand that national policy efforts to secure pastoral land rights, in 
spite of formal political backing, have come to a standstill in Karamoja, and what are 
the consequences of the stalled implementation for different actors?  !!
In order to investigate the overall research question, the analysis is guided by four sub-
questions. These act as building blocks upon which the research question is answered: 
1) How can we understand changing pastoral property rights and land use in 
Karamoja? 
2) What are the problem representations behind national policy efforts to secure 
pastoral land rights and how is power to control pastoral land legally 
sanctioned in such efforts? 
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3) How do different actors and their interests affect implementation of pastoral 
land rights in Karamoja?  
4) How is the implementation standstill of pastoral land rights related to the role 
of land in the broader political economy of Uganda? 
 
This thesis uses Uganda’s (agro-)pastoral Karamoja region as a specific example of how to 
explore the general case of implementation of pastoral land rights. Based on data generated 
from a six-week field study in Karamoja, combined with an extensive use of literature, the 
aim is to qualitatively explore how the implementation of pastoral land rights can be analyzed 
and understood. In order to do so, the thesis draws on analytical tools from both the access 
tradition, with its focus on local actors, as well as the land-grab literature’s focus on broader 
political and economic forces at play. More specifically, the thesis employs important notions 
of property rights as socially negotiated and legitimized (Berry 2002; Lund 2008). 
Subsequently, Bacchi’s (2012a) WPR-approach is used to investigate the ‘problematizations’, 
which underpin the formulation of land reform as well as the solutions it generates. To 
investigate the ‘politics of implementation’ (Mosse 2004), Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘access’ 
framework is used to explore local struggles over access to land fought by different actors in 
the local. Lastly, a ‘political settlement’ approach (Khan 2010; Whitfield et al. 2015) is 
applied to extend the analysis to encompass important structural forces at play in local 
struggles. Combined these approaches provides valuable insights on how the implementation 
of pastoral land rights can be analyzed and understood. Through this analytical lens, and an 
iterative process, we establish the overall argument that local struggles over access to land is 
inextricably linked to the political economy, and that the outcome of implementation of land 
reforms can only be explored through an analytical framework that includes a focus of the 
interconnections between actors at all analytical levels. !! !
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1.3. OUTLINE 
Chapter Two discusses the methodological choices underlying the thesis’ investigation of 
why pastoral land rights are not being implemented. The discussion reviews methodology 
pertaining to the thesis’ qualitative focus, use of theory, field research, data processing, and 
reflections on the process as a whole. !
Chapter Three outlines and discusses the four toolboxes that collectively constitute the 
analytical framework; namely: ‘conceptualizing dynamics of property rights’, ‘the 
competitive process of policy formulation’, ‘implementation: actors, interactions, and 
processes’, and ‘employing a political economy approach’. The chapter further relates these 
toolboxes to each of the thesis’ four analytical chapters.!
Chapter Four provides the thesis’ foundation of how to adequately understand the 
implementation standstill in relation to changing dynamics of property rights and land access 
in the example of Karamoja. This understanding of pastoral property rights functions to 
underpin the rest of the thesis’ analysis of the implementation standstill.!
Chapter Five examines how the formulation of policy solutions masks processes that 
simultaneously formulate 'problems'. These ‘problems’ are analyzed according to different 
ideological schools of thought wherein specific ways of prescribing ‘solutions’ reflect 
specific ways of perceiving the 'problems' surrounding pastoral property rights. The chapter 
further examines how overlapping property rights affect power to control access and rights to 
land. 
Chapter Six explores the politics of implementation by identifying various actors' use of 
mechanism of access to benefit from land. Pastoral land policies are therefore not 
implemented in a power vacuum but must be assessed according to different actors with 
varying sets of power to gain, maintain, and control access and rights to land.!
Chapter Seven investigates the political settlement in Uganda and thereby assesses the 
structural conditions and restrictions that influence implementation. The importance of 
minerals, patronage, and formal and informal channels of funding for the survival of the 
ruling elite are analyzed to show how the implementation standstill can be seen as a 'pocket 
of inefficiency' that sustains the ruling elite’s hold on power.!
In Chapter Eight, the conclusion will summarize the collective findings of the thesis. These 
findings are put into relation to each other to answer the overall research question.!
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2. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents and discusses the thesis’ methodology and provides the reader with the 
opportunity to review the credibility and resonance between data analysis and the theories 
applied. The thesis takes a qualitative approach, building on six-week field research carried 
out in early 2016 as well as extensive literature reviews on land, pastoral property rights, and 
political economy in Uganda. The next subsections assess the qualitative approach of the 
thesis in context to its credibility, use of research data, and its theoretical and empirical 
foundation. Subsequently, a more in-depth discussion follows of the methodological choices 
upon which this thesis is built. The chapter has a predominant focus on our active field 
research in Karamoja. !
2.1. REFLEXIVITY AND CREDIBILITY IN QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
Opinions differ on the scientific credibility and relevance of qualitative research. Some argue 
that observational methods are not a feasible entry point into testing out pre-existing 
hypotheses given that such research formats may present “an intense personal involvement 
[but at the same time result in] an abandonment of traditional scientific control […]” (Agar 
1986 cited in Silverman 2001:12). Others (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Silverman 
2001), argue that despite differences in methodology between both social and natural 
sciences, and qualitative and quantitative methods, qualitative research should not be 
disregarded as a viable way of checking claims against observations. From this perspective, 
we justify our employment of qualitative methodology in investigating the research question. 
In justifying the use of qualitative methodology, we underline the importance of ‘reflexivity’. 
Reflexivity pertains to all processes of knowledge production and our own, and others’ social 
positioning within such processes (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Reflexivity is 
employed to establish credibility, rather than attempting to live up to absolute criteria of 
reliability, validity and representativeness (Tanggaard and Brinkmann 2010). The 
presentation of methodology according to theory and data allows readers to assess and 
question the ‘resonance’ between theory, data, and the conclusions reached. Resonance here 
refers to Wilkan’s notion of:!
“a willingness to engage with another world, life, or idea; an ability to use one’s 
experience [...] to try to grasp, or convey, meanings that reside in neither words, 
“facts”, nor text but are evoked in the meeting of one experiencing subject with 
another or with a text” (Wilkan 1992:463).!
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We recognize that there is no absolute certainty of the truth of our knowledge production 
given that ‘reality’ is always viewed through particular perspectives and thus ‘reality’ is 
represented rather than reproduced (Silverman 2001). !
2.1.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
The overall research question is addressed through answering the thesis’ four sub-questions, 
each pertaining to its own analytical toolbox. Each analytical toolbox compliments each other 
and addresses the implementation of pastoral land rights from different angles, in a manner, 
which each separate toolbox is unable to do on its own. The toolboxes consist of selected key 
concepts and the integrity of any original theory in its entirety is thereby sacrificed to give 
room for the construction of more specialized, eclectic framework (see appendix 1 for an 
overview of the analytical strategy). The choices of concepts – and these concepts’ 
complementary relation to each other – are not outlined here. Rather, in Chapter Three they 
are explained in detail and put together into an analytical framework, which is later applied in 
interaction with our data. The production and interaction between data and theory are 
elaborated in the following section.!
2.2. CONDUCTING FIELD RESEARCH 
The thesis relies partly on six-week field research carried out in Uganda in early 2016 (Jan-
Feb). Field research was deemed necessary in order to collect reliable, up-to-date information 
on the current situation in Karamoja and to supplement and add detail to the limited (Czuba 
2011), and perhaps skewed, literature on the state of contemporary pastoral land rights in the 
region. Furthermore, field-based research is crucial due the thesis’ focus on what is not 
happening in implementation in spite of what is formally written down and committed to in 
policy. In preparation, partnerships with DanChurchAid (DCA) and Karamoja Development 
Forum (KDF) were established to gain access to the field. These partnerships were key in 
facilitating our stay and research in Karamoja, and provided vital information about the area 
and its issues and dynamics on land. This information was particularly important in relation 
to security and the sensitive nature of land as a topic during the then-ongoing 2016 
presidential and parliamentary elections.!
2.2.1. CHOOSING STUDY SITES: APPLYING THE EXTENDED CASE METHOD 
Situated in Uganda’s Northeastern corner, bordering Kenya and South Sudan, the Karamoja 
region covers an area of 27,200 km²; almost the size of Belgium. Consisting of seven districts 
(Moroto, Napak, Nakapiripirit, Amudat, Abim, Kotido and Kaabong), Karamoja is home to a 
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diverse array of ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Karimojong. Although often labeled 
as one unified group, the ‘Karimojong’ terminology refers to several subgroups, extending 
into neighboring countries, and is a definition that was “externally imposed, but has become 
accepted by the people to whom it refers” (Czuba 2011:7). Moreover, for analytical purposes 
the Karimojong are henceforth only referred to as pastoralists, rather than (agro-)pastoralists, 
despite a broader range of livelihoods.1 The size and diversity of the region imply a need for 
methodological considerations on how to approach the issue of generalizing, or even 
theorizing, about the implementation of pastoral land right in Karamoja and elsewhere. !
Field research was carried out in two sub-counties of Moroto district, in the Karamoja region, 
as well as in Kampala. Moroto town is the financial center of the region, home to the regional 
administration, NGO offices, and a military base. The two sub-counties, Nadunget and Rupa, 
were selected as our main study 
sites, in consultation with our 
local partners, due to their recent 
history of land and resource 
related conflicts, as well as their 
practical accessibility and 
proximity to Moroto town.2 The 
two sub-counties were chosen as 
they were deemed to represent 
examples of different types of 
land related struggles that 
existing literature had hinted at. 
Rupa is currently experiencing 
land conflicts related to mineral 
exploitation by external actors 
and government gazettement of 
land for conservation (see e.g. 
Human Rights Watch 2014; 
Kabiswa et al. 2014). In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Pastoralism does not cover the diversity of livelihoods performed in the Karamoja region. Some groups are 
almost entirely sendentarized, some are hunter-gatherers, and some rely mainly on pastoralism. 
2 Accessing communities via partners comes with the risk of potentially reproducing both the geographical and 
social focus of the partners. Taking this risk was a trade-off we had to make given our limited timeframe. 
Map of Karamoja with Rupa and Nadunget sub-counties (in white). 
(Source: Author modified from Rugadya et al. 2010) 
!
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comparison, Nadunget is faced with large-scale land deals and expropriations of land for 
industry, infrastructure, and military installments (see Tebanyang et al. 2015).  
It is important to note that these two sub-counties refer to very concrete places in which a set 
of specific events is happening. It is therefore, arguably, necessary to ask, “of what is this a 
case?” (Lund 2014:226). As this thesis is a study of singular events in a narrow and limited 
physical context, it is crucial to situate the findings of the particular cases to broader 
perspectives varying in time and space. Essentially this means moving, back and forth, from 
the specific to the general, and from the concrete to the abstract (ibid.). Building on the 
‘extended case method’3  concerned with extracting the “general from the unique” and 
moving from the “micro to the macro” while building on and challenging existing theory (as 
laid out by Burawoy 1998:5). The thesis ascribes itself to what Burawoy calls a ‘reflexive 
model of science’. This essentially means that we constantly consider the intersubjectivity 
between the studied field and ourselves. By comparing our findings with other cases from 
different localities or time – looking at how these cases may resonate with each other – this 
comparison may enable us to challenge theory and generalize on our own. In this sense, 
examples from throughout Karamoja may at first glance appear comparatively different to 
both each other and studies conducted elsewhere, yet with certain elements or dynamics 
resonating between them, making generalization and theorization possible.  !
It is our belief that it is not possible to understand local realities without paying attention to 
the global social order. We therefore build on the ideas stemming from multi-sited fieldwork, 
arguing that instead of seeing the local life-worlds of our studied subjects as something 
distinct from the world-system, we need to follow the connections and association between 
the local and the global (Marcus 1995). Doing so requires focusing on the local ‘realities’ of 
Karamoja while combining these with an investigation into the larger political economy of 
land as a resource in Uganda and elsewhere to the extent it can be traced. Our field research 
is hence multi-sited in both spatial and temporal terms, and the different sites are not treated 
with the same practices and intensity; i.e. while viewed as just as important to the other sites, 
fewer interviews were conducted in Kampala, where the conditions and opportunities were 
different. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The term ‘extended case study’ was originally coined by the Manchester School of social anthropology with 
notable contributions by Max Gluckman, Jaap van Velsen, and Clyde Mitchell, amongst others (Burawoy 1998) 
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2.3. FIELD RESEARCH METHODS 
An overview of the field research period can be found in appendix 2. The primary data 
collection method during the six weeks of field research was semi-structured interviews. 
Participant observation was further used as a method of data production: engaging in social 
gatherings and informal conversations. Participant observation additionally had a 
supplementary function to interviewing as it allowed us to gain access to and set up formal 
interviews. During participant observation, we progressively gained access into social 
situations and settings (Spradley 1980) by engaging in cultural practices and showing 
willingness and interest in understanding the lived experiences of our research subjects.!
2.3.1. SEMI-STRUCTURED, ETHNOGRAPHIC INTERVIEWS 
Our approach to interviewing is inspired by Holstein and Gubrium’s view (1997) on 
interviewing as a process of ‘active meaning-making’, where knowledge is produced in the 
interactions between participants. The interactional nature of active meaning-making 
represent a critique of the more positivist approaches to interviewing, as it moves beyond the 
idea of the researcher as a neutral collector of pre-existing data. The basic premise 
underpinning Holstein and Gubrium’s view is that knowledge is constructed in social 
encounters and dialogue and that our role as interviewers cannot be ignored, as we as 
researchers bring our own presence into the interaction. In this sense, ‘truth’ is not a pre-
existing objectifiable realm; it is created in and via dialogue. What we analytically choose to 
highlight as data, and how we choose to represent ‘truth’, determines what becomes data 
(Faircloth 2012). From this point of view, interviews will always be biased and contaminated 
as interview responses from any interview, no matter how formalized and standardized they 
may be, are products of interactive processes. This bias, however, does not make 
interviewing less worthy as a method but rather emphasizes that understanding how meaning 
is produced during the interview process is as critical as capturing what is substantively asked 
and responded. !
2.3.2. EXPERT AND GROUP INTERVIEWS 
A mix of interview types was used as part of our field research conducted in Karamoja: e.g. 
expert and group interviews. In addition to these types of interviews, we further engaged in 
data production through informal conversations and activities, to ground our experiences in 
more informal, lived experiences as articulated by people outside formal interview settings.!
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Our choice of conducting expert interviews was based on the practicality of acquiring 
knowledge through people with broad overarching knowledge of the field we wished to 
investigate (Heckathorn 1997; Bogner et al. 2009). Expert interviews were conducted both 
prior to, and during, our field research. We had a consultative ‘expert’ meeting with a scholar 
with extensive field experience from Karamoja, and during our own field research met with 
representatives of state institutions and NGOs. In spite of the immediate advantages of using 
expert interviewing, the ‘expert’ knowledge of interviewees should be questioned (Bogner et 
al. 2009). The experts, with whom we consulted, can only be regarded as experts according 
to certain relative parameters. The experts we interviewed were often part of an elite – 
particularly within state institutions and academia – and their views did not necessarily 
resonate with the lived realities of the ‘average’ Karimojong. 
!
Before imitating the field research, we planned to conduct individualized interviews in 
Karamoja, based on the assumption that such would facilitate individuals on both state, non-
state and community level to more freely discuss the events, situations, and social phenomena 
relating to land that they participated in (Tanggaard and Brinkmann 2010). Upon arrival, we 
soon realized that individual interviews were not always possible given that interviewees, 
particularly on community level, expressed a preference for group interviews. As a 
consequence, we adapted to the circumstances and conducted a mix of individualized and 
group interviews according to the preferences of our interviewees. A potential reason for 
communities’ occasional unwillingness to engage in individualized interviews could be 
PICTURE:  
GROUP INTERVIEW IN 
NADUNGET SUB-COUNTY 
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rooted in a fear of mistakenly being taken for sharing information with potential investors. 
Czuba (2011) notes that some interviewees in Karamoja may be reluctant to share sensitive 
information due to the region’s history of suppression. Similarly, it is not unlikely that 
communities’ may have been reluctant to share information with us due to the region’s recent 
history of non-transparent land deals, involving only a few dishonest community individuals. 
In this sense, only sharing knowledge in the presence of other community members could be 
seen as a way of mitigating potential misunderstandings within the communities. 
2.3.3. DEVELOPING INTERVIEW GUIDES AND THE USE OF INTERPRETERS 
Prior to conducting interviews we developed interview guides (see appendix 3). These guides 
were tailored for each population segments that we targeted: women, community elders, 
youth, national actors, NGO-representatives, and local government officials (see appendix 4 
for a full list of interviews). In the process of developing interview guides, Kvale and 
Brinkmann particularly inspired us, and the questions asked were developed on the basis of 
their nine types of interview questions (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). We created a sequence 
of suggested themes and questions to be covered during the interviews but simultaneously 
remained flexible and open to changes in order to follow up the specific answers given and 
stories told by the research subjects. As Legard et al. note, “the interactive nature of the in-
depth interview means that the researcher’s next question should be determined by the 
interviewee’s answer, not determined in advance” (Legard et al. 2003:156). The essence of 
Kvale and Brinkmann is to establish why and what should be asked and answered before the 
question of how is posed (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Consistently, we strived to make the 
questions easily understandable, short, and without academic language in order to enable as 
accurate as possible understandings of the questions among our interviewees. The aim was to 
exclusively use the subjects’ own glossary – their ‘emic terms’ (Eriksen 2001) – which meant 
that we elaborated and reformulated our interview guides several times as we learned more 
about the interviewees’ own typologies. !
To obviate misunderstandings, at least between our interpreters and ourselves, we went 
through the interview guides together before putting them into use. We furthermore had 
debriefings after each interview where we, in consultation with our interpreters, would 
discuss the interview situation and contents. Where interviewees were sufficiently proficient 
in English this functioned as the working language, and the interpreter would only stand-in in 
case of us requiring assistance. Given that interpreters interpret the questions asked and 
answers given during interviewing, they, not unlike researchers and interviewees, should also 
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be regarded as “active producers of knowledge” (Berman and Tyyskä 2011:181). It is hence 
key to keep in mind how interpreters, as active meaning-makers, may have influenced our 
field research, and data generation and processing.!Rather than hiding the power dynamics 
that arise in the meeting between researchers, interpreters and interviewees, we have 
continuously attempted to engage according to the power dynamics of each interview setting 
we engaged in. Interviewing has, in this sense, been conditioned by the opportunities and 
constraints of our interpreters’ socio-cultural and political standing within the local cultures 
(age, gender, ethnic background/clan membership, political affiliation, etc.) while also adding 
valuable access across cultural and linguistic barriers. As a result, our empirical data is 
produced not only through our own analytical lenses but also our interpreters’. !
2.3.4. SAMPLING OF INTERVIEWEES  
The main body of our empirical data has been produced through verbal and nonverbal 
interactions. Thus, whom we talked to and how we found interviewees is of great importance 
to our findings. Different methods of sampling were used in an attempt to facilitate broad 
access to different sampling groups within our logistic reach. We used ‘nonprobability 
sampling’ (Bernard 2011), as our aim was to understand a complex socio-political 
phenomenon, rather than to make a statistical generalized sample of the population. Within 
nonprobability sampling, we used chain-referral methods to gain access to pastoral 
communities as ‘hidden populations’ whose sizes and boundaries are largely unknown 
(Heckathorn 1997).!
In Karamoja we initiated with a sampling of ‘key informants’, who were especially 
knowledgeable on land-related struggles and whom we questioned about others’ behavior, 
rather than their own (Heckathorn 1997). After becoming more familiarized with our field of 
interest, we made a ‘targeted sampling’. In effort to cover a diverse array of multiple 
perspectives on the phenomenon, we conducted a ‘(non-)proportional quota sampling’ 
(Bernard 2011). We produced a detailed list, specifying the types of interviewees that we 
wanted to interview and the desired number units from each category in each of the two sub-
counties (see appendix 5 for quota-sampling overview).!
We were informed that it was unwise to make contact with potential interviewees among the 
communities without having individuals respected and known to the communities vouch for 
us beforehand. This was due to a general mistrust and skepticism towards outsiders (as 
potential investors, affiliations to the state, etc.). In addition, scarcely populated and remote 
pastoral rangelands, and poor means of transportation, rendered it impossible to go from 
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homestead to homestead. Consequently, striving to access all the categories of people we had 
targeted, we became very dependent on the method of ‘snowballing’ (Heckathorn 1997; 
Bernard 2011). Especially one person, who was respected, socially well connected, and 
working for a local CSO, played a significant and invaluable role as ‘fixer’ or gatekeeper to 
the pastoral communities. Furthermore, snowballing functioned as a tool to identify and 
locate individuals who had or were experiencing particular conflicts over pastoral lands, 
thereby increasing the scope and range of the data available to us. However, one of the major 
pitfalls of snowball sampling is that referral to new interviewees happens on the basis of 
interests and power relations that are largely unknown to the researcher (Heckathorn 1997). 
We are aware that this kind of sampling is biased as it links us to people that tends to be 
socially well connected, and that the connections initially established have led our research in 
a particular direction. However, as our quota of various target populations directed the 
snowballing sampling, we ensured that subjects from different areas and sub-groups would 
appear in the final sampling. In addition, we tried to counter the deficiencies of snowballing 
by continuously indicating to our fixer that we wished to include as many perspectives on the 
phenomenon as possible. This got us in contact with people whom our fixer did not find to be 
adequate or appropriate to interview in the beginning, as exemplified below: !
Researcher:  “Can you get us in contact with him?”!
Gatekeeper:  “No, you do not want to speak with him. He is a corrupt liar – 
 he is even a landgrabber himself.”!
Researcher:  “But we still would like to talk with him.”!
Gatekeeper:  “You really want to interview the landgrabber?”  
 
(NGO-representative, Moroto, 11/02/16) !
We strived to also have informal conversations when the opportunity presented itself in 
village centers, buses etc. This form of “convenience or haphazard sampling” (Bernard 
2011:147) allowed us to access individuals independent from the social network of our initial 
sampling. This method, however, only extended to people living close to Moroto town and 
the village centers.!
2.3.5. ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDNOTES 
Inspired by ‘Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes’ by Emerson et al. (2011), we used 
ethnographic fieldnotes as the framework for documenting our field-based research. We 
found fieldnotes to be the best choice of documentation for a number of reasons. The 
conflictual nature of land rights in Karamoja makes land a sensitive issue, meaning that audio 
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or video recordings would have been inappropriate in many situations, as they would allow 
identification of interviewees based on their voices or appearances. Fieldnotes allowed us to 
capture and document behavior transcending verbal conversation, such as surroundings, the 
interviewees’ appearances, their voice and facial expression accompanying their statements, 
and our own reflections during the interview (Emerson et al. 2011). Working in a largely 
impoverished area, we found it more appropriate to bring notebooks rather than video or 
audio recorders. !
When jotting down fieldnotes, we paid attention to initial impressions of places, people, 
interactions, and of people’s spatial positioning in the interview situation, as this could reveal 
key insights on prevailing power relations. We made sure to document whenever 
interviewees’ answers had a surprising, contrasting, or ‘new’ nature compared to other 
interviews, and when interviewees placed particular emphasis on what they saw as essential 
in their experience of land-related conflicts (Emerson et al. 2011). While writing fieldnotes, 
usually one or two people made jottings, whereas one person served as the main 
communicator, leading the interview and directly engaging in dialogue with the interviewees. 
In situations, where we felt something was said in confidentiality, we chose not take notes. 
We always asked for permission to take notes prior to interviewing, and guaranteed 
interviewees full anonymity.!
After returning from the field, jottings were typed into our computers as more coherent 
fieldnotes. In these fieldnotes, we included reflexive, methodological notes such as our own 
ideas, thoughts, intuitions, hypotheses, and reflections on observations. We aimed at 
producing these coherent fieldnotes as soon as possible after the interview had concluded, 
and before talking to each other about our understandings of the episodes, to get as many 
nuances as possible.!
2.4. RETURNING FROM THE FIELD: REFLECTIONS AND DATA PROCESSING 
Having completed the field research period, the next step was to process and analyze the 
gathered data, as well as to reflect upon the field research period itself, including challenges 
and their impact on the final result. !
2.4.1. ANALYZING FIELD RESEARCH DATA: CODING 
Upon the termination of the field research period the fieldnotes were read, processed, and 
analyzed using ‘focused coding’ (Emerson et al. 2011). The aim of coding was to identify 
! 21 
themes and similarities between information, breaking down the vast amount of material into 
manageable elements. Codes and sub-codes were developed on basis of initial read-throughs 
of the material together with key concepts pertaining to the applied theories. A list of codes 
and sub-codes, alongside an example of a coded fieldnote extract, can be found in the 
appendices (appendix 6 and 7). After coding fieldnotes, elements pertaining to particular 
codes and sub-codes were aggregated and ascribed to the relevant sub-questions of the thesis. 
Hereafter, the sorted material was condensed and compared to theories, to analyze the 
interactions between theory and empirical data, to see consistencies and/or discrepancies. !
2.4.2. REFLECTIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The act of conducting of field research is always contextual, relational, embodied, and 
politicized, which is why field researchers must always consider a range of ethical concerns, 
especially when field research is conducted in a ‘foreign culture’ (Bourgois 2007). Ethical 
reflexivity in research should involve reflection on self, process and representation. It is 
therefore crucial to reflect on our ‘positionality’ as outsiders, and how aspects of gender, age, 
race, marital status, class, etc. determine our relational position to interviewees, which 
reinforces and creates power inequalities (Binns 2006). In short, this means that how 
interviewees perceived and defined us affected their responses. Collaborating with KDF and 
DCA was highly beneficial in terms of gaining access to the field but inevitably also 
influenced how our interviewees perceived us. In most parts these affiliations worked in our 
favor, as we found both organizations to be widely recognized and trusted among the 
communities. People may, however, have had incentives to articulate things as worse than 
they actually were in order to receive support from the organizations: the issue of ‘reactivity’. 
Additionally, in terms of positionality, we also experienced that taking time to establish trust 
– clarifying our status as students, and conducting interviews with people of the same sex as 
ourselves – opened up for freer conversations. !
Field research was conducted in the time surrounding the 2016 presidential and parliamentary 
elections, which presented a number of obstacles to carrying out the research. At our arrival 
in Uganda the election campaigns were well into their final stages, leading people to gather at 
large rallies. People were evidently on their toes due to fear of potential riots. We were aware 
of the elections prior to arriving in Uganda and although we had anticipated challenges, the 
effects of the elections had been hard to plan around given the uncertainty of their severity. 
The election restricted our mobility in Karamoja due to rallies and dangers of being 
associated with election activities. Ultimately, the elections made us to return to Kampala a 
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week prematurely. Following the advice of the our partners, the choice to leave a week in 
advance was based on considerations of how to best organize our time in accordance with 
what was possible. Leaving prematurely essentially meant that we had less time than we had 
planned for to conduct research in Karamoja. On the other hand, the elections were 
sometimes a useful topic of discussion and a good icebreaker when initiating conversations or 
interviews. The elections undoubtedly amplified political grievances and are likely to have 
made the contentions between different elements of society more visible and hence easier to 
capture and address.       !
During the field research process, we consistently strived to follow principled guidelines of 
good ethical conduct (African Studies Association 2005). Given the sensitive and politicized 
nature of the issue of pastoral land rights, exacerbated by the time of political unrest in the 
election period, we were very attentive to our interviewees’ privacy and informed consent 
(ibid.). Making sure that all our interviewees consented to interviews in an informed manner, 
we initiated each interview with a clear, honest, and upfront introduction of our interest and 
agenda. This served to reduce the risk of creating false expectations among the interviewees 
about our ability to provide financial or material compensation or services. In consultation 
with our two partner organizations, we were advised to distribute tobacco and soft drinks to 
the interviewees after interviews; a gesture our fixer referred to as, “a symbol of appreciation 
and new friendships” (NGO-representative, Moroto, 03/02/16). By following our partners’ 
standard procedures, we strived to replicate their approach as to not jeopardize their future 
access to the field site by creating an increased demand for appreciation in form of money, 
gifts, or services. We deemed the distribution of tobacco and soft drinks a necessary trade-
off, as access to information from communities was conditioned by certain reciprocal 
expectations.!
In terms of the honesty of ‘representation’, we, as researchers, “see things through a lens of a 
priori concepts formed through experience” (Lund 2014:226). Our interpretation of events 
are colored by a priori concepts that after new experiences ought to change and develop as 
new cognition (ibid.). We have sought to promote openness to new understandings i.e. 
through our flexible approach to interviewing (see section 2.3.1.) to allow a progressive 
evolution of both our analytical framework, our understanding of the implementation 
standstill in Karamoja, and our data. We acknowledge that it is impossible to entirely 
discount the risk of bias in our data, but we have strived to carefully check narratives using 
data triangulation, by reviewing resonance between our own and secondary data.!  
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3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter outlines the theoretical foundation underpinning the thesis’ analysis of the 
implementation of pastoral land rights, and how interests of various actors of different social 
groupings affect implementation. The chapter is divided into four parts, each part feeding into 
a distinct part of the analysis; namely: ‘conceptualizing dynamics of property rights’; ‘the 
competitive process of policy formulation’; ‘implementation: actors, interactions, and 
processes of power’; and ‘employing a political economy approach’. The four parts combined 
provide the analytical lens, through which the implementation of pastoral land rights is 
analyzed and understood in this thesis.!
3.1. CONCEPTUALIZING DYNAMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Before presenting issues of policy-making and implementation of property rights in land law 
and policies, it is appropriate to first assess what property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa entail. 
Assessing notions of property rights is particularly essential given that throughout the 
continent, questions of access to and control over land as property are some of the most 
prominent and contested debates of local politics (Boone 2014). Scholars and academic 
researchers have produced a large body of literature debating the issues of property rights, 
ownership, and access to specific resources such as land, water and minerals. These debates, 
popularly referred to as the land question, are concerned with the rising tensions in rural 
Africa emerging from land scarcity and growing competition over land access – increasingly 
associated with enclosure and a growing exclusiveness of land rights (ibid.). The core of 
these debates is the relationship between the nature of property rights and economic and 
political transformation (Lund 2008). !
Recent anthropological and political sciences literature suggests a complex, dynamic and 
multidimensional nature of land and land ownership. Berry (1993) has inspired the 
perspective that African land tenure and property rights must be seen as social processes. 
Property rights are from this perspective the interchangeable sets of social rules governing 
people’s rights to access, use, and control the land resources that sustain livelihoods for most 
of Africa’s population (Boone 2014). Consequently, land rights and land tenure should not be 
understood as static but rather as dynamic sets of rules that are constantly negotiated and 
renegotiated, shaped by social processes and interaction between people (Berry 2002; Peters 
2004; Boone 2007; Lund 2008). In this sense, people ‘invest’ in social relations in order to 
attain and maintain access to land resources (Berry 1993). Berry emphasizes the significance 
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of negotiability of rules and relationships, which according to her is a fundamental 
characteristic of African societies (Berry 2002). Negotiation of land rights involves, “all sorts 
of tactical and strategic maneuvers that affect the outcome in terms of changing, transforming 
or solidifying a land claim” (Juul and Lund 2002:5). We position ourselves critically towards 
the liberal connotations underpinning the negotiation-terminology employed by these 
scholars, as it silences that not all actors are equally able to negotiate access and rights to 
land. Negotiation takes place in various fora, and forum-shopping is limited in the sense that 
these fora are not available to all. Consequently, in this thesis, we prefer the concept of 
‘struggles’ to emphasize that battles over access to land resources are fought on the basis of 
unequal power relations, highlighting the need for an analysis of the political economy of 
land, featured in Chapter Seven.!
3.1.1. THE COMPLEXITY AND UNIQUENESS OF PASTORAL PROPERTY RIGHTS  
The concepts of ‘property’ and ‘land tenure’ have significantly unique meanings to pastoral 
communities. Typically, pastoralist production systems cover large areas of relatively 
unproductive drylands as well as smaller areas that are wetter and more fertile (Lane 1998). 
Due to the harsh climate and periods of climatic shocks, pastoralists rely heavily on flexible 
and negotiated cross-boundary access to land and resources. Seasonal migratory movements, 
mobility and systems of communal land tenure are key features for their survival (Catley et 
al. 2013). The fluid and flexible land tenure arrangements of pastoralists stands in clear 
contrast to the more static, bounded and fixed forms of sedentary land tenure that has 
emerged as the norm in most African land tenure reforms (Kameri-Mbote 2013). 
Furthermore, the sheer notion of land ownership fits poorly with the way pastoralists relate to 
land. Rather they are stewards or custodians of the commons, which means that the living 
holds land in trust for future generations and only enjoy customary ‘usufruct rights’4 (Lane 
1998; Joireman 2011). !
The way pastoralists hold land in common has been a topic of widespread and continuous 
confusion in literature and policy. Numerous scholars and policy-makers have misconceived 
the communal forms of pastoral land tenure as ‘open access’ resources, in which land is not 
owned by anyone and not subject to any tenure rules (Lane 1998). Profound knowledge of 
pastoral tenure systems all over the African continent reveals that it is more precise to speak 
of ‘controlled access’ resources, as pastoral lands may be the subjects of several overlapping !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 A term derived from civil law, meaning the right to use and enjoy fruits or profits of something belonging to 
another (Joireman 2011). 
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categories of rights holders. Pastoral ‘controlled access’ tenure regimes tend to be communal 
in form, in which access to land is based on membership in a group defined by lineage or 
cultural identity. Communal tenure is differently complex than common property as it can 
include different forms of tenure ranging from true common property to individual ownership 
within the communal system:!
“These tenure systems can be envisaged as a matrix in which rights to different 
resource categories are partitioned within a hierarchy of different ownership 
groups ranging from the individual producer up to the largest tribal or ethnic 
group. Mobility is possible because these ownership groups are not territorially 
distinct but possess overlapping and potentially conflicting rights to different 
categories of resources in one area” (Behnke 1992 in Lane 1998:7). 
 
Behnke speaks of a hierarchy of customary ownership holders entitled to different categories 
of resources in a given area. Access and rights to land and resources must therefore be 
understood according to the legitimacy of the authorities that enforce them (Lund 2008; Sikor 
and Lund 2009). When assessing pastoral property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is thus 
important to bear in mind that while rights to land may be regulated by legal enforcements, 
they are also negotiated by the social networks within communities. !
3.1.2. UNDERSTANDING PASTORAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In this thesis, we adopt an approach to land rights and land tenure as socially constructed 
rules in a state of constant flux where the definition and enforcement of property rights occur 
within complex political and social structures (Lund 2008; Boone 2014). Property is hence 
closely interconnected with issues of power and legitimacy as authority essentially 
determines the capacity to define property and vice versa (Berry 2002; Sikor and Lund 2009). 
Issues of land rights are thereby not just a matter of who should get access to land, but also 
who should decide and on what basis (Berry 2002). As this thesis is concerned with struggles 
over access to land for the pastoral communities in Karamoja, we apply notions that may 
facilitate a useful definition of pastoral property rights, including the nature of pastoral 
property rights as flexible, fluid, communal tenure arrangements, and property rights as 
constituted by social relations based on different levels of power to negotiate such. These 
notions are applied in Chapter Four and feature as the main means to understand how we can 
define and understand pastoral land tenure and property rights in Karamoja. The notions 
serve as the foundation upon which we subsequently build analyses of how and why practical 
recognition of pastoral land rights has yet to happen in spite of official political commitment 
to ensure such.!
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3.2. THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS OF POLICY FORMULATION 
Having established how to think about pastoral property rights and tenure, we turn to theories 
of how to analyze how these rights are specified in law and policy. Public policy is 
conventionally defined as, “a series of intentionally coherent decisions or activities taken or 
carried out by different public and sometimes private actors [...] with a view to resolving in a 
targeted manner a problem that is politically defined as collective in nature” (Knoepfel et al. 
2011:24). Policy is hence the programming phase prior to implementation, in which a 
problem is defined, and goals, target groups, and instruments for change agreed upon in order 
to solve this problem (ibid.). However some scholars question if policy formulation is 
actually clear and coherent, as legislation often requires ambiguous language and 
contradictory goals to hold together a passing coalition (Matland 1995). !
3.2.1. MAKING POLITICS VISIBLE: UNFOLDING THE PRODUCTION OF POLICY 
Mosse (2004) proposes that policy is a result of social processes and the power to control 
interpretations and narratives. Hence, it is key to examine the way in which policy ideas are 
socially produced. The more interests that are tied to particular interpretations, the more 
stable and dominant development’s policy models become given that they are defined and 
legitimized through such interpretations. One of his main arguments is that, “[...] policy (i.e. 
development models, strategies and project design) primarily functions to mobilize and 
maintain political support, that is to legitimize rather than orientate practice” (Mosse 
2004:648). Policies are important less for what they say than for whom they bring together in 
coalitions and alliances. Mosse underlines that policy analysis is pivotal to the understanding 
of what happens in arenas of development as interests and priorities of different actors 
politically shape policies, which is examined in Chapter Five.!
3.2.2.  THE WPR APPROACH: PROBLEM REPRESENTATION IN LAW AND POLICY 
In line with Mosse’s arguments, critical scholars have initiated a discussion of whether a 
policy is developed to solve a problem or rather to create a problem (Bacchi 2012b). Policy 
and gender theorist Carol Bacchi has, based on Foucault’s concept of ‘problematization’, 
developed an approach to policy analysis that focuses on what she terms ‘problem 
representation’ (ibid.). The basic premise underpinning her ‘What is the Problem Represented 
to be?’ (WPR) approach is that what we do about something indicates what we think needs to 
change – what we identify as problematic (Bacchi 2012a). Countering the conventional idea 
that policies are developed by governments as best efforts to solve specific problems, she 
argues that solutions (policies) come before problems. In her view, specific solutions – or 
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ways to talk about a problem in policies – impose particular interpretations on the issue. In 
this sense governments create problems with particular meanings and interpretations rather 
than reacting to them. The state thereby has the power to articulate both solutions and the 
problems they address (Bourdieu 1994). Policies characterize problems in ways that affects 
what gets done, how people live their lives, who gets harmed, and who benefits. Problems 
representations do not necessarily refer to deliberate or strategic framing of problems though 
“at times members of government portray issues in particular ways for political gain” (Bacchi 
2010:2).!
Bacchi advocates for taking departure in any policy proposal and “work backwards” to 
deduce how policy produces an inherent problem (Bacchi 2012b:4). She introduces a series 
of questions “designed to tease out conceptual premises, to draw attention to, the “history” 
(genealogy) of specific problematizations, and to consider their effects, including 
subjectification effects, for how people live their lives” (ibid.:5). The table below illustrates 
Bacchi’s six questions for scrutinizing policy. 
No.! Questions! Facilitate an investigation of:!
1! What is the problem?! Implicit problem representations within a policy!
2! What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this 
representation of the ‘problem’?! Underlying premises in the representation of the problem!
3! How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come 
about?! Contingent practices and processes behind the problem representation!
4! What is left unproblematic in this problem 
representation? Where are the silences? Can the 
‘problem’ be thought differently?! Gaps or limitations in the problem representation!
5! What effects are produced by this representation of 
the ‘problem’?! How the problem representation limit and shape people’s understandings of themselves and the issue 
and impact people’s lives materially!
6! How/Where has this representation of the ‘problem’ 
been produced, disseminated and defended? How has 
it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and 
replaced?! Contestation surrounding representation of the problem!
                                                                    (Illustration based on Bacchi 2012a) !
Applying the list of questions to a problem representation is a form of ‘problem-questioning’ 
– a way, we argue, of tracing how dominant development policy models and particular 
interpretations have become stable.!
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In Chapter Five, we apply step one, two, and six of Bacchi’s WPR approach in order to 
question and examine the problematizations behind Uganda’s land laws and policies. All six 
questions are interconnected but the choice of using question one, two, and six is based on 
their ability to examine the assumptions that underpin land laws and how these assumptions 
can be questioned. Inspired by Mosse (2004), we approach problem representations and 
solutions suggested in policies as dominant and stable narratives of land sector development. 
Narratives become stable due to multiple interests and priorities of different actors embedded 
in these specific interpretations. Regardless of events, the dominant policy model will remain 
stable until the political alliance behind it is no longer strong enough to uphold political 
support. Evidently, ideological battles are fought in the formulation of policy, however, as we 
will learn in the following section, in developing countries significant battles are often fought 
during implementation.!
3.3. IMPLEMENTATION: ACTORS, INTERACTIONS AND PROCESSES OF POWER 
In classical terms, implementation may be defined as, “the set of processes after the 
programing phase that are aimed at the concrete realisation of the objectives of a public 
policy” (Knoepfel et al. 2011:196). In short, this entails going from paper to practice. To 
understand the relationship between policy model prescriptions and development practices, 
we need to unfold the concept of implementation.!
3.3.1. TWO MAIN APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation research can roughly be divided into two paradigms, building on different 
schools of thought. The first paradigm, still dominating much development thinking, takes an 
instrumental view of policy as rational problem solving. The fundamental idea in this 
classical approach is that implementation happens automatically once appropriate policies are 
in place (Mosse 2004). Joireman critically refers to this as the ‘fallacy of legalism’ – the 
ignorant belief that creation of law through statute, legislation, or precedent will be sufficient 
in bringing about social change:!
“Creation of law may be necessary, difficult, and challenging, but it is ultimately 
insufficient to achieve social change; enforcement is what enlivens law and moves 
it from printed word to public space. A property right that is not enforced does not 
exist” (Joireman 2011:5).!
Despite the now well-established notion that law alone is insufficient to bring about social 
change, this instrumental approach to implementation has continuously informed land reform 
debates in African countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa (Manji 2001).!
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The second, critical paradigm, originally set out to challenge the assumptions of the 
instrumentalists to explain the occurrence of implementation failure (Mosse 2004). Since the 
1970’s, this paradigm has represented a move away from the prescriptive assumption that 
policy is something that one simply “carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce and complete” 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973 in Manji 2001:331). The paradigm criticizes how dominant 
management models isolate development interventions from historical, social, and political 
realities of the Third World (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995) and studies have suggested that 
implementation is a no less complex political process than policy formulation (Bardach 1977; 
Lindblom 1979; Mosse 2004). These studies examine why policies are not carried out as 
intended, and the ways in which policies undergo invention or mutation during 
implementation (Manji 2001; Mosse 2004). Some of these scholars argue that the 
development sector’s obsession with legal rights has moved critical focus away from the 
power struggles evident within the actual realization of rights (Cousins 1997). Various 
studies conclude that it is difficult to predict policy outcomes when the rational and informed 
efforts of legislators are met with likely resistance and non-compliance on the ground or 
when economic circumstances make implementation impossible (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973; Elmore 1979; Manji 2001). In opposition to the instrumental paradigm, which assumes 
that policy and implementation are distinct activities that take place in sequence, the critical 
perspective finds it inaccurate to define policy and implementation as two distinct and 
consecutive phases. !
A decade ago, Mosse critically pointed out that enormous energy was devoted to generating 
the right policy models, whereas surprisingly little attention was paid to the relationship 
between these models and the practices and outcomes that they were expected to generate or 
legitimize in particular contexts (Mosse 2004). He described this gap between policy 
prescriptions, on one hand, and poverty reducing effects on the other as a “black box” (Mosse 
2004:641), where development agencies, researchers, and national governments were too 
preoccupied with getting policy right. The same tendency applies to land law, where: 
“The importance of effective implementation of new land laws and the difficulties 
associated with it are alluded to in almost every recent piece of writing on African 
land reform. However, the process of implementation remained neglected and 
little theorized” (Manji 2001:327). 
 
Now, ten year later, development initiatives have instead become obsessed with targets and 
measuring outcomes. However, what is still largely neglected are the politics of 
implementation. In developed countries struggles are rampant in policy formulation, whereas 
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in developing countries, where policy formulation is largely donor-driven, struggles take 
place in the politics of implementation (Thomas and Grindle 1990; Grindle 2001). The black 
box therefore still exists in terms of the largely unknown political struggles shaping the 
outcome of policy, which is what Chapter Six investigates. !
3.3.2. THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Policy implementation involves a range of individuals and groups of social actors on the side 
of the developers and on the side of those to be developed (de Sardan 1988; Thomas and 
Grindle 1990). Inspired by the critical approach to implementation, we argue that the 
outcome of policy as planned intervention results from complex interactions between 
different actors that cannot be approached from a mechanical and linear approach. We need 
to acknowledge that no matter how well laws and policies are formulated, they are “enacted 
by institutions of limited resources and competing interests” (Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010:901). !
Power struggles take place in the process of defining property rights in legal frameworks but 
often even greater battles are fought in the process of realizing these property rights (Cousins 
1997). This explains why de jure property rights do not always translate into de facto land 
ownership and access. The analytical focus should therefore be set onto people’s capabilities 
to put property rights into effect (Juul and Lund 2002). Examining the socio-political 
struggles taking place during implementation of policy provisions to secure pastoral land 
rights, we must analytically zoom in on the actors and institutions involved in such processes. 
In doing so, it is essential to look at the state, as the state is responsible for defining and 
enforcing such rights. Bourdieu (1994) elaborates the significance of the state, arguing that 
the state’s accumulation and monopolization of symbolic capital enables it to articulate and 
control rules, interpretations, and procedures. Given this powerful position of the state, it 
cannot be overlooked when looking at pastoral land rights in light of the global surge in 
natural resource investments. !
Growing evidence has shown that while fragile states – or states with limited capacity – may 
be susceptible to land deals, they are not simply passive targets of powerful international 
actors being forced to sell off their land. Rather, states are often primary or key actors in 
large-scale land and resource transfers, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of selling 
what they often already claim as their own (Wily 2011,2012; Wolford et al. 2013). This calls 
for a different analysis of land and resource investments and their implications than the 
contemporary, conventional ‘weak-state’ analyses. These suggest that large land deals are 
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likely to happen in ‘fragile’ states solely due to their inability to provide tenure security and 
proper land governance to protect their citizens and territory (see e.g. Arezki et al. 2011). In 
this sense, land tenure insecurity and weak land governance have been simplified and 
depoliticized as lack of capacity and technical knowledge of the state rather than perceiving 
the state as an active agent in governing land and resource within its, albeit limited, capacity. 
Depoliticized perspectives have neglected that good governance and land rights “are not 
implemented in a vacuum” (Wolford et al. 2013:191). The state cannot be regarded as one 
uniform entity. Rather, it is made up by different actors working at different levels within and 
outside the ‘state’ apparatus. Given that the state is made up by different actors, sometimes of 
conflicting interests, the state “never operates with one voice” (ibid.:189). It is therefore 
necessary to unbundle the state in order to explore the motives of different sets of actors who 
collectively constitute the state. Such an analysis must also include actors in peripheral 
networks of the state who indirectly take part in influencing the politics of implementation. 
Wolford et al. further imply that we need to look at land and resource investments in specific 
historical and geographical terms, as power relations are created in a particular context, 
leading to varying practices and implications, resulting in a multitude of diverse forms of 
dispossession.!
3.3.3. THEORY OF ACCESS: ABILITIES TO GAIN, MAINTAIN AND CONTROL ACCESS 
As a means to theorize the struggles fought by various state and non-state actors in the 
process of realizing property rights and access to land, Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘access 
theory’ is applied. This framework draws attention to actors and their incentives, constraints 
and powers, shaping implementation of policies to secure pastoral property rights. Key in 
Ribot and Peluso’s access framework is that ‘access’ differs from ‘property rights’. While 
‘property’ refers to rights sanctioned by law, ‘access’ is a broader term that accommodates 
legal as well as extra-legal mechanisms, structures and relations governing the use of land 
resources. Access is thus a process of power, as individuals possess ‘bundles of powers’ that 
determine their ability to benefit from land resources. Therefore the social relations that 
produce power to gain, control, or maintain access are equally critical to consider, as are 
legal property rights. In the investigation of the implementation of pastoral land rights, access 
theory may help to understand dynamics of de facto land access in spite of the installation of 
national law and policy’s formalized, legal rights. The access framework puts forward an 
array of ‘mechanisms of access’ that constitute, “the means, processes and relations, by 
which actors are enabled to gain, control and maintain access to resources” (Ribot and Peluso 
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2003:159p). These mechanisms are divided into two categories: ‘rights-based’ access and 
‘structural and relational’ mechanisms of access, which are analytically useful categories as 
they help illuminate how land rights are constituted by not only legal rights but equally by 
power to enforce and regulate access to land. !
Rights-based access comprise of both legal and illegal access. Legal access is sanctioned by 
law, custom, or other types of conventions, often with the state as the ultimate mediator 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). Legal access is what is equated with conventional notions of 
property rights. Illegal access refers to the ability to benefit from resources through means 
not socially sanctioned by the state or society.!
The power to control and maintain access, gained through rights-based access, whether legal 
or illegal, is further conditioned and shaped by structural and relational mechanisms of access 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). These mechanisms are related to social and political-economic 
relations and discursive strategies that enable access. Relational and structural mechanisms 
include, but are not limited to: access to technology, capital, markets, labor, knowledge, 
authority, identities, and social relations (Ribot and Peluso 2003). The categories listed in the 
previous segment will not be elaborated further here but will instead be drawn upon in the 
analysis when relevant. !
The access framework is applied in Chapter Six to map out flows of benefits and mechanisms 
of access used by investors, state and non-state actors, and local communities to gain, control 
and maintain access in Karamoja. The framework sheds light on how flows of tangible and 
intangible benefits on the local level shape implementation of land law and policy, and more 
specifically, efforts to secure pastoral land tenure. Ultimately, Ribot and Peluso’s framework 
allows us to move beyond depoliticized capacity discussions and investigate implementation 
as a complex political process. The process is the nexus of struggles between various actors 
with varying portfolios of power. !
3.4. EMPLOYING A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
Property rights literature and the access framework, presented above, have a general focus on 
the local level but do also acknowledge that wider political and economic structures are 
important as people do not operate freely in a power vacuum (Berry 1993; Ribot and Peluso 
2003). Rather, people are constrained and enabled by structural conditions underpinning their 
respective interests; structural conditions that they not only maneuver within but also take 
part in forming. Therefore, we add a political economy framework to add an important extra 
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analytical dimension to encompass the wider structural restrictions and conditions that shape 
actors’ economic and political behavior in regards to land5. !
The framework is based on relevant key elements from Mushtaq Khan’s notion of ‘political 
settlement theory’ (2010) as elaborated by Whitfield et al. (2015). Political settlement in this 
regard refers to the mutually constitutive relation between power distribution in society, 
patron-client networks and their effect on governing the distribution of economic benefits in 
society (Whitfield et al. 2015). Political settlement is a shorthand concept for the distribution 
of power in society, addressing how political and economic behavior incentivizes each other 
within structural frames. While Whitfield et al. deal with the politics of industrial policy, the 
use of relevant framework components, in this thesis, is adapted to examine the 
implementation standstill of pastoral land rights in law and policy. !
3.4.1 POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS AND POLICY OUTCOMES 
A vast amount of literature has suggested that political behavior in Sub-Saharan African 
states is organized in and around patron-client networks (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; 
Acemoglu et al. 2004; Arriola 2009). But what underpins this intense focus on patron-client 
networks? Is it culturally induced behavior, lack of bureaucratic competence, understanding 
of governance, or some entirely different defunct societal modality that makes patron-client 
relations so prevalent? In contrast to most other approaches, Khan (2010) suggests that the 
dependency on rents and patron-client networks is caused by the lack of domestic capitalists, 
who can formally fund the political system through taxes, which makes patron-client 
relations the dominant distributional logic (see Whitfield et al. 2015). Consequently, patrons 
use rents to satisfy and award clients outside the ‘formal’ economy in order to maintain 
political power (Hansen et al. 2014). In line with this, Khan (2010) argues that the ‘political 
settlement’ – the set of institutions and power relations that characterize social order in a 
particular country – determines the distribution of benefits to different classes and groups in 
society according to their relative power. Power is derived from political as well as economic 
spheres that combined underpin the power of the patrons.!
Inspired by political settlement theory, we draw on the framework to understand how the 
distribution of power in society relates to the government’s incentives to pursue and ability to 
implement policies. In line with Whitfield et al. (2015), we adopt the concepts of ‘ruling 
elites’ and ‘ruling coalitions’ to understand the competing interests of different actors within !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In doing so, we emphasize the importance of both structure and agency in shaping human behavior. 
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and beyond the ‘state’. The word ‘state’ or ‘government’ offer little theoretical leverage for 
understanding these competing interests, which create incentives that shape policy 
formulation and implementation. Inspired by the need to see how actors interact and the 
logics driving their actions based on their particular position within the state, lumping these 
individuals together makes little sense (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). ‘Ruling elites’ refer 
to political leaders atop an incumbent regime, whereas ‘ruling coalition’ refers to the groups 
and individuals who give the ruling elite support in exchange of benefits. The ruling coalition 
keeps the ruling elite in power by organizing political support in the form of patron-client 
networks (ibid.).!
The distribution of power in a country-specific political settlement shapes economic and 
political behavior of the ruling elites (Kjær 2015). More specifically, the coalitional pressures 
mediate how ruling elites act. If the ruling coalition is fragmented and unstable, the political 
elite will pursue short-term political imperatives of staying in power rather than long-term 
investment in national development (ibid.). A high level of fragmentation induces the ruling 
elite to spend huge sums on patronage to win elections and maintain political support in order 
to stay in power (Kjær and Katusiimeh 2012). The increasing cost of holding the ruling 
coalition together can be referred to as a process of ‘inflationary patronage’ (Barkan 2011). !
POCKETS OF EFFICIENCY   
The distributional cost of maintaining the ruling coalition absorbs a large amount of 
resources, which consequently may impede implementation of policy initiatives pushing for 
broad economic transformation of the country (Kjær 2013). Yet, this does not count for all 
sector policies. Whitfield et al. note that some policies are implemented remarkably 
efficiently in a sea of inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. ‘Pockets of efficiency’6 in the 
bureaucracy in charge of implementing policies within a specific sector emerge as the result 
of political support of bureaucrats, when there are particular policies that the ruling elite 
wants to implement (Whitfield et al. 2015). If the ruling elite wants to implement particular 
policies – for example because of mutual interests between the ruling elite and capitalist 
within the particular sector – they will find the resources needed and will protect the 
implementation of such policies despite resistance. The ruling elite’s ability to create pockets 
of efficiency depends on two factors.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The term dates back to the 1980s (see Leonard 2010). 
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First, the ruling elite must have a significant degree of control within and outside the ruling 
coalition. The less control or authority over the higher and lower level factions of the ruling 
coalition, the more difficult it is for political leaders to create pockets within the bureaucracy 
insulated from the particularistic demands of the ruling coalition. Secondly, the ruling elite 
must have a significant degree of control over competent and loyal state bureaucrats to ensure 
efficiency in carrying out the ruling elites’ side of the deal with capitalists. Ruling elites make 
policy decisions, while bureaucrats implement them (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). These 
two factors underline that vulnerability and contestation in the political settlement make it 
difficult for the ruling elite to keep factional demands from undermining implementation of 
policies and thus difficult to create a pocket of efficiency (Whitfield et al. 2015). If 
promoting a particular sector hurts the interest of powerful groups within the ruling coalition, 
they will resist it and the ruling elite is likely to consider it too costly to implement. Similarly, 
the ruling elite is likely to promote a sector, which provide them with support from important 
factions of the coalition. More particularly, when economic entrepreneurs in a certain sector 
are important either because of their provision of government revenue or because they 
provide funding for the ruling party, ruling elites are likely to implement policies that favor 
such a sector (Kjær 2015; Whitfield et al. 2015). Essentially, the structure of the ruling 
coalition determines the political costs of policies, as well as the effectiveness of 
implementing them, given the resistance or support from powerful groups in society (Khan 
2010; Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011).!
The political settlement framework presented here is applied in Chapter Seven to analyze 
how investments in land and other natural resources, and the implementation of policies to 
secure pastoral land rights, are linked to the distribution of power and benefits in the political 
settlement. 
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4. PASTORAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KARAMOJA 
This chapter explores how to understand changing pastoral property rights and land use in 
Karamoja. Pastoralists in Karamoja have, like pastoralists in many other places across the 
world, seen an erosion of their access to land due to diverse factors such as conflict, adverse 
development agendas, privatization, establishment of game reserves, population pressures, 
etc. (Mamdani 1982; Knighton 2003; Czuba 2011; Behnke and Freudenberger 2013). In 
order to understand pastoral land rights, it is crucial to investigate the historical, social, 
political, and economic contexts that these rights are situated within (Berry 2002). Land 
tenure arrangements are thus to be understood as dynamic sets of rules that are shaped 
through historical and contemporary social processes and interactions (Berry 2002; Peters 
2004; Boone 2007; Lund 2008) where different struggles are fought to claim and enforce 
ownership and access to land. From this point of departure, the chapter investigates the 
history of land tenure and rights in Karamoja, developments in customary governance, the 
legal provisions of rights in national land law and policy, and the current post-conflict 
context. A post-conflict scenario in which the region is experiencing an influx of different 
actors working to secure rights to valuable natural resources found in the region. The aim is 
to establish the basis upon which to understand pastoral land rights in Karamoja in 
discussions about making and implementing policy and law about pastoral land rights. 
4.1. THE IMPLEMENTATION STANDSTILL 
In 1995 a new constitution was passed in Uganda, which brought about fundamental reforms 
of ownership, tenure, management, and control of land, differing significantly from reforms 
of the past. Based on the Constitution, the government introduced the 1998 Land Act, and 
later, in 2013, a National Land Policy. The Land Act of 1998 affirms, in accordance with the 
1995 Constitution, that “[a]ll land in Uganda shall vest in the citizens of Uganda and shall be 
owned in accordance with the following land tenure systems: a) customary; b) freehold; c) 
mailo; and d) leasehold” (Land Act 1998:3). These two pieces of legislation represent two 
forms of pioneering for Uganda. It makes Uganda one of only a few states in Africa where 
land belongs to its citizens, and it represents the first time in Ugandan history that customary 
tenure – tenure based on social practices and traditions recognized by its respective local 
communities (Foley 2007) – became formally recognized (Pedersen et al. 2012). Attempting 
to enhance the security of land rights for land under customary tenure, the Land Act provides 
pastoralists with the ability to own land communally through the establishment of Communal 
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Land Associations (CLAs), and through acquiring Certificates of Customary Ownership 
(CCOs).! Yet, existing literature and our field research showcase that recognition of 
customary land rights in Karamoja has yet to be carried out in practical terms in spite of 
vigorous promises to do so. As a result, most of the customary land in Karamoja remains 
untitled and vulnerable to appropriation (Asiimwe 2015). Since enactment of the Land Act in 
1998, not a single certificate of customary ownership has been issued to communities in 
Karamoja. Kabiswa et al. note that in Karamoja, “[a] number of applications have 
nevertheless been vetted and approved but certificates have not been granted” (Kabiswa et al. 
2014:63), and similarly Uganda Land Alliance, upon successfully establishing 52 CLAs, 
notes that all associations are still waiting for their registration certificates from the central 
government (Nnamulondo et al. 2015). When asked why CCOs have not been approved, a 
person in the District Land Board explained:!
“We are told [by the Minstry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development] that 
the format is too simple. There is a need to make it more complicated. It needs to 
be formalized to be secured against forgery. This could be easily done but has 
now taken many years. They keep people in darkness. The political will to make 
CCOs is not there!” (District official, Moroto, 12/02/16). 
 
He puts forward that due to lack of political will CCOs have “found [their] death” (ibid.). 
The government has begun piloting the implementation of CCOs. However, so far Karamoja 
region has not been chosen for piloting, in spite of the Karimojong facing particular 
vulnerability with up to 62 percent of land being licensed for mining (Asiimwe 2015; 
Kabiswa et al. 2014). The diagnosis of lack of political will asks for an in-depth study of the 
dynamics of political will. The recognition of pastoral land rights have initially enjoyed 
political support, but now interest appears to have waned as the implementation of such 
recognition has not been executed and has effectively come to a standstill. To understand 
what implications the legal provisions of customary land rights and the lack of 
implementation of such in Karamoja have, they should be analyzed according to Karamoja’s 
historical, temporal and spatial context, starting from its colonial legacy.!
4.2. LAND MANAGEMENT IN KARAMOJA AND THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
“But not everything is caused by the [current] government, many problems in Karamoja go 
back to colonial history. When the British were here they made Karamoja into a human zoo” 
(NGO-representative, Moroto, 28/01/16)!
Karamoja has until recently taken a position at the margins of the Ugandan state. During 
colonial rule (1894-1962), the British introduced individualized ownership property rights on 
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land that had hitherto been held communally. The new system was a complicated system, 
built to create political relationships. In this way, the new system of ownership either 
replaced existing customary land access, or re-confirmed pre-existing tenure arrangements in 
the politically important kingdom areas in the Southern parts of the country. In other parts of 
the country, customary tenure was allowed to persist with only small modifications (Lane 
1998; Land Policy 2013). The British saw few economic opportunities in the dry, remote 
Karamoja region. A short-lived ivory trade meant that the population, which to some extent 
was also restive of the colonial power, began to accumulate guns, in exchange for ivory. 
These guns were used in occasional, customarily accepted cattle raiding (Mirzeler and Young 
2000). Alarmed by this, and due to the area’s relative insignificance for the British, the 
protectorate authorities proclaimed Karamoja a ‘closed’ district. The British were successful 
in subduing cattle raiding but never managed fully eradicated its causalities (Knighton 2003). 
In closing off the region, Karamoja was effectively turned into a ‘human zoo’7 (Cisternino 
1979). The inhabitants of the region were as a result viewed as primitive and uncivilized and 
were held in little regard by the colonial authorities in Entebbe and no committed, systematic 
efforts were made to transform the customs and practices of the region. This laissez-faire 
approach ultimately meant that the Karimojong were left with a certain degree of social and 
political freedom to continue a relatively stateless way of life (Czuba 2011) as the colonial 
government had little interest in the region and thereby in exercising authority to enforce or 
change land access.!
4.2.1. TRADITIONAL LAND MANAGEMENT 
The laissez-faire approach of the British protectorate authorities meant that the customary 
governance system in Karamoja, which had developed as a system of complex social 
structures and customary laws, lived on. The customary governance system of the 
Karimojong essentially functioned to maintain community bonds, upkeep and restore 
harmony in times of conflict, and to guide and govern religious proceedings, community 
health, animal migration, and other important aspects of the Karimojong lifestyle (Carlson et 
al. 2012). The Karimojong society was and still is, in spite of challenges of decreasing cattle 
stocks, structured around the keeping of cattle and is organized through territorial occupancy 
and kinship structures based on male lineages (Rugadya et al. 2010; Czuba 2011). The 
Karimojong occupy semi-permanent manyattas around which some agriculture is practiced.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 A label often applied in later literature, first used in context to the region in M. Cisternino’s book, ‘Karamoja 
the Human Zoo: The History of Planning for Karamoja with Some Tentative Counterplanning’ (1979). 
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Cattle are usually kept in semi-mobile 
kraals. Due to limited, sporadic and 
unpredictable rainfall patterns and poor 
soils, the pastoral lifestyles in Karamoja 
are based on flexible, temporary and 
negotiated cross-boundary access to 
pasture, water and other resources to 
sustain pastoralism as a viable livelihood 
(Krätli 2010; Catley et al. 2013). 
Pastoralism has continuously been 
showcased to be the most viable mode of 
production in the harsh dry lands even 
today (FEWS NET 2005; Levine 2010). 
Customary Karimojong land tenure can be 
divided into customary communal land 
tenure, which applies to grazing areas and 
religiously important shrine lands, and 
customary individualized land tenure applying to homesteads and gardens (Rugadya et al. 
2010). The opportunistic, inter-clan negotiated, land tenure system ensures that herd owners 
can freely and legitimately access resources according to need and availability. Access rights 
to grazing lands are generally based on, and negotiated through, being member of clans and 
sub-clans, as well as a customary right of historical usage. As a result of the customary tenure 
and access arrangements in Karamoja, the vast majority of the land is untitled given the lack 
of need for such in the customary system. However, land is in this sense not open to all, but 
rather relies on a system of controlled-access (Behnke in Lane 1998), where access is rooted 
in cultural or lineage belonging rather than formally recognized rights or ownership of land. 
Similarly to what Behnke writes about pastoralism, land in Karamoja is only held on the basis 
of stewardship as access to land relies on usufruct rights, where the individual clan-member 
can benefit from the land as a resource while only having subordinate rights.!
In addition to state authorities, pastoral land rights must be understood according to the 
authorities within communities who regulate access. In a gerontocratic 8  system, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 “Rule by elders; specifically :  a form of social organization in which a group of old men or a council of elders 
dominates or exercises control” (Merriam-Webster dictionary definition) 
PICTURE: 
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MOROTO TOWN !
!
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Karimojong elders – together with elected kraal leaders – wield the authority in matters 
related to land rights, governance, and use. Although the social organization of the 
Karimojong is not described in detail in this thesis (instead, see Rugadya et al. 2010; Czuba 
2011), one man explained how, “we call them [elders] key defenders. Those who hold land in 
trust of the community” (CBO-representative, Moroto, 02/02/16). He refers to how land 
should not be sold, as the land is held in trust of future generations. Elders act as the 
customary custodians of the land, knowing demarcations, ensuring consequent access, and 
largely define and enforce property rights among the Karimojong. This underlines Lund’s  
(2008) view that decision-making power over land access is intrinsically tied together with 
authority. !
4.2.2. POST-COLONIAL RULE IN KARAMOJA 
While the traditional Karimojong governance system had maintained a relative autonomous, 
albeit rather closed-off, status during the colonial rule, this changed with the enactment of 
post-colonial rule. A Commission was in 1961 entrusted with the task of examining the 
‘underdevelopment’ of the Karamoja region. The Commission found that Karamoja differed 
from the rest of Uganda as it was “primitive to the extreme”, and that the region was 
occupied by “brave warriors” who would stop at nothing to achieve their goals. The 
Commission concluded that “[t]he only force they [the Karimojong] will respect is that 
superior to their own and the only authority, that which can fight and defeat them” (Mirzeler 
and Young 2000:415). Independence called for incorporation of Karamoja as part of nation-
building efforts, and the region had a continuous reputation for being unruly, backwards and 
underdeveloped. As an attempt to exercise state sovereignty, and to once and for all put an 
end to cattle raiding, the Obote I government sent the army to fight the armed Karimojong 
raiders, stationing an army battalion in Moroto (Mirzeler and Young 2000; Knighton 2003; 
Czuba 2011). This became the starting point of increasing authoritarian state presence in 
Karamoja still visible today.        !
The post-colonial governments were highly inspired by the modernist development agenda 
dominant at the time. The idea, simply put, was (and still is today) that the underdeveloped 
region had to “catch-up” with the rest of Uganda (Krätli 2010:4): i.e. the traditional lifestyles 
of the Karimojong were seen as inferior and wrong. Post-colonial development interventions 
thus focused on the encouragement of food crops, livestock disease control and cattle 
commercialization, as well as improved water supply and education (Mirzeler and Young 
2000). These efforts were largely unsuccessful, with one apparent reason being that 
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“[m]odernity had little to offer for societies with viable, shock-resistant lifestyles and stable, 
effective governance systems” (Czuba 2011:16). The Obote I army held the region under 
brutal rule but still failed to eliminate the presence of the gun which continued to creep in 
from neighboring countries. The Karimojong had no place in the new government and had no 
political influence, which continued well into the successive Amin government (1971-79). 
Yet, as part of continuous civilizing efforts, Amin was extremely brutal and perpetrated a 
number of massacres on the Karimojong population (Mirzeler and Young 2000). The harsh 
treatment of the Karimojong by the national governments had the effect that they increasingly 
began to see the Ugandan state as an enemy whom they had never desired to be part of 
(Knighton 2003; Eaton 2010). The increasing state authoritarian presence in Karamoja 
illustrates the ongoing national project to define not only property rights but also rightful 
development of the region, which effectively ended the relative autonomy of land governance 
the Karimojong had hitherto experienced. !
4.2.3. INSECURITY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF CUSTOMARY AUTHORITY 
When Amin was overthrown in 1979, the soldiers stationed at the army barracks in Moroto 
fled their positions, fearing retaliation from the people whom they had brutally suppressed. 
Leaving behind a well-stocked armory, the barracks were quickly looted by the Karimojong. 
People repeatedly brought up the large-scale acquisition of automated weapons during our 
field research as a decisive moment for the region. As one man recalled, “you would see 
groups of women carrying guns and ammunition on their heads as they walked out from the 
barracks. Just as you see them walking today. So, so many guns” (Male, Moroto, 13/02/16). 
Cattle raiding, which had been subdued but never eradicate under British rule, reignited, and 
was exacerbated by a 1980 famine which killed as many as 50,000 people and resulted in 
livestock levels dropping to half of what they had been in 1962 (Mirzeler and Young 2000; 
Czuba 2011). Raids within the region became rampant with the better-armed groups raiding 
those weaker. The region slowly sank into widespread insecurity, and while it may be a 
fallacy to accuse the proliferation of guns to be the cause of insecurity, it nonetheless altered 
power balances, not least as it threatened the state’s monopoly on violence (Knighton 2003).!
There is widespread disagreement within literature on what effect the proliferation of guns 
had on the authority of elders, but literature generally agrees that the authority of the elders 
plunged in the conflictual years after 1979. Some argue that the presence of the gun fostered 
an emergence of warlords, taking over authority from the elders as the guns were in the hands 
of younger men (Ocan 1994). Others are more cautious, questioning the existence of actual 
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‘warlords’ and rather ascribe this process to a more general trend of the youth – perhaps 
influenced by modernist thinking – growing tired of traditional leadership (Czuba 2011). 
Nonetheless, it remains clear that cattle raiding went from being a venerable mechanism of 
distribution – used for acquiring cattle for bride wealth and retaliation against enemies – to 
taking on commercial dimension (Eaton 2010). Carlson et al. (2012) lists dynamics that can 
be seen as causal to the process of eroding customary authority. A recurrent theme, particular 
alluded to, is the role of the state. State interventions in Karamoja have, in spite of heightened 
insecurity, chronically favored agricultural transformation, disregarded pastoral lifestyle and 
needs, and systematically undermined strategies of pastoral production (Mamdani 1982; 
Krätli 2010; Ronald 2014; Mosebo 2015). Moreover, recurrent disarmament efforts entail 
some vital explanations for elders losing authority. The most recent disarmament programs 
took place in 2001/02 and again in 2006/07 under the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and 
Development Programme (KIDDP). Disarmament efforts have been ungentle and 
significantly stained by human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2007). One measure 
of the KIDDP program was the establishment of protected kraals, where animals and herders 
were forced to maintain close proximity to Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), 
arguably for the army to be able to protect those disarmed (Stites et al. 2010).  Herders who 
did not submit to the protected kraal system were automatically suspected of hiding weapons 
(Krätli 2010). Disarmament, and the establishment of protected kraals, reduced the authority 
of elders, as it restricted the mobility of herds, and limited elders’ decision-making power 
over grazing movements (Stites et al. 2010). Insecurity and disarmament squeezed the 
population together, altering grazing patterns, putting pressure on resources, and bringing 
together groups that had no previous historically established access rules already in place 
(Ronald 2014). Elders’ role as dispute mediators broke down, and they lost their ability to 
perform akiriket9 due to a lack of cattle available for performing the rituals, as well as the 
army’s restrictions on the ritual. The cumulative effects of guns, famine, decreasing cattle 
stocks, insecurity, and continuous state disregard of the pastoral livelihoods of the 
Karimojong created clear limitations and alterations of the authority structures in Karamoja. 
The flexible and communal tenure systems vital for the viability of pastoralism were 
compromised by the increasing authoritarian presence by the state and military, and a 
situation of overlapping rights began to materialize. Based on Unruh’s argumentation (2003), 
the Karimojong’s de facto access to land became increasingly restricted and undermined by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Sacred gatherings where religious rituals are performed and political decisions made, including the blessing of 
cattle raids. The most important visual manifestation of customary authority in Karamoja (Czuba 2011).   
! 43 
the Ugandan government given the prevailing legal pluralism and competing authority to 
enforce property rights and access to land.!
4.3. KARAMOJA TODAY: POST-CONFLICT AND LAND RELATED CONFLICTS  
“Before the Karimojong did not know the value of land. Land is so valuable! Now they have 
learned. They are now trying to defend their land, and people are disputing between each 
other - these are new dimensions” (Male, Moroto, 01/02/16) !
Today, in spite of continued incidents of insecurity, Karamoja is today experiencing a 
relative peace compared to the armed conflicts, which previously ravaged the region. The 
region, however, still constitutes what may be labeled a post-conflict setting, as incidents of 
violent conflict still occur. In such a setting, securing land rights and access is particularly 
complex, as colonial and postcolonial legacies continue to permeate contemporary land 
governance and authority. Rules, norms, legitimacy, and authority concerning natural 
resources in a post-conflict setting are arguably more dynamic and fluid (Unruh 2003) and of 
different nature to the traditional systems of the Karimojong. The effects of these legacies 
ultimately change land tenure relationships and development perspectives. The Karimojong 
must continuously employ destitute coping mechanisms to address significant poverty – with 
an estimated 75 percent of the population living below the poverty line (MoFPED 2014) –
food insecurity, displacement of people during the protracted years of conflict, and, 
especially important for this thesis, the erosion of customary authority.!
4.3.1. MERGING STATUTORY AND CUSTOMARY AUTHORITY IN KARAMOJA 
Significant disagreement prevails whether the customary authority of elders in Karamoja has 
been restored. It is relevant to consider the interconnection between authority, property 
rights, and land access, as the ability to exercise and enforce land governance has clear 
implication for de facto access to land (Unruh 2003; Lund 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009). 
While some scholars argue that the authority of elders have eroded through recent years 
(Carlson et al. 2012; Vaughan and Gurung 2013), others argue that the position of the elders 
have largely been restored (Czuba 2011). The existence of legal pluralism, where customary 
and statutory authority simultaneously struggles for legitimacy in Karamoja, has altered 
dynamics of authority. Many contemporary sources repeatedly emphasize that Karamoja 
stands in front of the challenge of merging the formal and the informal governance systems 
(Carlson et al. 2012). The Land Act provides an institutional framework for a decentralized 
land management system. The new land legislation devolves responsibility for land 
governance to local government bodies, referred to as Local Councils (LCs), who are to be 
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regularly elected by local communities. These LCs operate at five levels: Village (LC1), 
Parish (LC2), Sub-County (LC3), County (LC4), and District (LC5). The LC-structure is 
responsible for registration and administration of land as well as land dispute resolution. The 
so-called Area Land Committees at sub-county level are responsible for land titling of 
customary land (van Leeuwen 2014). During our time in Karamoja it was evident that a 
process of merging customary authority with the government-imposed LC-system is already 
well under way, which further exemplifies Karamoja as a region in rapid transformation; not 
least in regards to property rights and the authority to enforce such. Our experience showed 
that Karimojong elders are now represented in the LC-system at the LC1-, 2-, and 3-levels. It 
is, however, important to keep in mind that while increased political representation of the 
Karimojong could help secure and restore greater authority of elders, this representation also 
create new dynamics of authority, pertaining to social relations between individuals and 
government. Authority may be misused at the cost of communities and the restoration of 
traditional governance systems. The new dynamics of authority, as interpolated between the 
merging of the customary and formal system, should in this regard be seen as yet another 
destabilizing factor to land governance, albeit with the potential to transform the region.!
4.3.2. EMERGING LAND ISSUES 
The installment of relative peace in Karamoja has come with new challenges. The relative 
stabilization of the region, in terms of combated armed violence, is fraught with the challenge 
of domestic and foreign actors working to gain access to the region’s now accessible land 
and natural resources. As argued before, this means that currently Karamoja is in a time of 
transition, where the issue of land has the potential to become either the driver of new 
intensified conflict, or the link to potential poverty alleviation and development (Human 
Rights Watch 2014). The government can justify land acquisitions, as pastoral rangelands 
seem either vacant or idle, or alternatively under-used and unproductive. The exploitation of 
these unutilized lands holds the potential of significant benefits for the local populations 
(Evers et al. 2014). This dynamic is captured by a spokesperson for a community affected by 
a land dispute, explaining that,  
“issues of land have become very pressing after the peace came. Now people rush 
to Karamoja to acquire land. People [outsiders, investors] think that it is free 
land. People see that it is vacant and thinks it is free. People come from outside to 
survey land and some come to buy” (Male, Moroto, 01/02/16). 
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Land is now not only subject to an internal hierarchy of rights holders within communities, as 
the government allows investors to access land in the region in the name of development. In 
this sense, the usufruct and untitled rights of the Karimojong may be consciously overlooked.!
It is important to understand that the new dynamics of authority to enforce and grant access 
to land in Karamoja also bear with them different interests of the actors that take part in the 
social negotiations – or violations – of the rights of others. Property rights, in accordance 
with our argued critical stance towards the notion of liberal free-for-all negotiation of 
property rights, are thus not freely agreed upon but are rather defined in interactions with 
limited access for some actors; in this case the local communities in Karamoja. Political and 
economic transformation incentives play a vital part in how property rights are enforced 
today. The social webs that constitute legitimate land governance, in contrast to the 
traditional governance system of the Karimojong, are now highly interweaved with national 
and international authorities and interests over land.!
4.3.3. MINERALS AND GAZETTEMENT OF LAND 
The rush for land experienced in Karamoja is caused by both the establishment of relative 
peace and more importantly the potentials of extracting minerals. The discovery of more than 
50 valuable minerals such as gold, copper and marble, has led to an expanding mining 
industry and influx of foreign investors (Otim and Charles 2013; Kabiswa et al. 2014). The 
government facilitates access to the land under which these minerals are located, as well as 
coordination with existing land rights of the Karimojong. As of 2014, statistics report that 
17,038 km2, amounting to 61.67 percent of the entire surface area of the region, are licensed 
for mineral extraction and exploitation (Kabiswa et al. 2014). The specifics of how de jure 
land rights and de facto land access affect pastoral property rights for the Karimojong are 
taken up in the following chapters. What is important to keep in mind in relation to pastoral 
property rights here is that authoritarian presence of the Ugandan government in Karamoja 
affects the dynamics of land access, with particular implications for local communities. The 
government has the power to (de-)gazette land and allocate rights and access to land to 
facilitate development; often at the expense and dispossession of the supposedly 
unproductive and underdeveloped land use and rights of the Karimojong. Historically, 
dispossession of land through land acquisition has been prevalent with both colonial and 
postcolonial governments (Mamdani 1982). In 1965, 94.6 percent of the entire region was 
gazetted as wildlife conservation areas (Rugadya et al. 2010). What is important to note is 
dispossession of land also means a dispossession of rights and access to land. In spite of 
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degazettement of about half of conservations areas in 2002, Rugadya et al. note that little 
effort has been made subsequently to ensure access and rights to land for the Karimojong.!
4.4. SUB-CONCLUSION 
In Karamoja, colonial and postcolonial legacies have altered the dynamics which determine 
pastoral land tenure and property rights. Dynamics of authority to define and enforce pastoral 
property rights in the region have been transformed by years of protracted conflict, increased 
state authoritarianism, overlapping legal and customary rights, the establishment of relative 
peace, and the merging of customary and formal land governance systems. This transition 
has the potential to enhance the authority of Karimojong elders but also runs the risk of 
concentrating authority with few individuals on different administrative levels, who do not 
necessarily act in the interest of communities. 
With pastoral property rights being in a state of rapid transformation, the discovery of 
minerals – and possibilities of extraction in the post-conflict setting – has led to an increased 
presence of the state and investors in Karamoja. This has intensified the need to investigate 
land governance and pastoral rights. While national law and policy recognizes customary – 
and thereby pastoral – property rights, both literature and our field research have shown that 
such recognition has yet to be carried out in practical terms. As a result, land in Karamoja 
remains untitled and vulnerable to appropriation. The legally prescribed pastoral property 
rights in Karamoja must therefore be seen as part of a long history of land dispossession and 
authoritarian state influence.  
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5. PASTORAL LAND RIGHTS IN POLICY FORMULATION 
This chapter examines the rationales and problem representations behind national policy 
efforts to secure pastoral land rights. It starts with an explanation of how pastoral property 
rights are dealt with in Uganda’s current land law and policy. The chapter subsequently 
moves on to selected questions of Bacchi’s WPR-framework to tease out the 
‘problematization’ of pastoral customary tenure in Uganda’s land law and policy, and the 
fundamental rationalities and conceptual premises underpinning the way problems are 
represented. We then turn to contestations surrounding this problematization. This 
methodology underscores that problems and their solutions should not be taken for granted, 
as they are carved out of socially produced explanatory models. Problematizing dominant 
political blueprints provides an understanding of the social, political, and ideological battles 
happening within processes of land tenure reformation. Furthermore, problematization 
underlines the argument that the definition of customary, pastoral property rights are products 
of social struggles as argued in the previous chapter. Subsequently, an analysis follows of 
how legal mechanisms of appropriation and overlapping property rights regimes endow the 
government with legal powers to overrule pastoral land rights. This analysis sheds light on 
the broader legal foundation in which the government’s policy efforts to protect pastoral land 
rights are embedded.!
5.1. PASTORAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN UGANDA’S LAND LAW AND POLICY 
Identifying specific references to pastoralists and pastoral property rights in Uganda’s land 
law and policy is a relatively difficult endeavor. In 2009, Parliament failed to launch a 
promised Pastoral Policy (Mosebo 2015), and again in 2014, a ‘Rangeland Management and 
Pastoralism Policy’ was drafted in Kampala. The policy has, however, to this date yet to be 
passed into enactment by Parliament. Instead pastoral property rights are stipulated in the 
wider body of Ugandan land legislation such as the Constitution (1995), the Land Act (1998) 
and the Land Policy (2013). Pastoral property rights generally fall under the category of 
customary tenure and are only sporadically explicitly described. Accordingly, when we seek 
to analyze how pastoral property rights are represented and problematized in Ugandan law 
and policy, it is necessary to examine customary property rights as a whole. Pastoral 
communities are largely neglected in the 1995 Constitution and 1998 Land Act, whereas the 
2013 Land Policy designates a whole paragraph to the rights of and need to safeguard 
pastoral communities:!
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“Access to land resources [for pastoralists] has also progressively reduced, as 
successive individual, private and government agency actions, alienated grazing 
areas for the establishment of national parks, wildlife reserves, protected areas, 
government or military schemes and ranching schemes. Whereas nomadic 
pastoral practices are allegedly associated with land invasions or grabbing and 
“illegal” land buying in some areas, it is necessary to protect pastoral land 
rights” (Land Policy 2013:59). 
!
The Land Policy stipulates the need to protect pastoral land rights, committing to ensuring 
that, “[l]and rights of pastoral communities will be guaranteed and protected by the State” 
(Land Policy 2013:60). Given the government’s commitment to the protection of pastoral 
communities’ rights to land, it is central to investigate the solutions proposed by the 
government to ensure this protection. !
5.1.1. RETHINKING AND QUESTIONING PROBLEMATIZATION  
Inspired by Bacchi (2010; 2012b), problems are not readily identifiable and objective in 
nature. Specific policy proposals or articulations of a problem in legislation impose a 
particular interpretation of such problem. Other proposals may create competing 
representations of the same problem. In the abovementioned legislation, the Ugandan 
government creates particular impressions of what the problem of the current land tenure 
system is. From Bacchi’s perspective, we should trace back how customary tenure is 
represented as a problem in the major policies set up to deal with this issue. The following 
three sections seek to illuminate firstly, what is the problem represented to be, secondly, what 
presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem, and thirdly, how 
has it been questioned, disrupted and replaced? The next three subsections serve to answer 
these questions.!
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM OF CUSTOMARY PROPERTY RIGHTS REPRESENTED TO BE? 
In analyzing how customary pastoral property rights are problematized, two central pillars in 
the Land Act and in the Land Policy are of particular relevance as they have key implications 
for pastoral property rights; 1) the aim of greater incorporation of land into Uganda’s national 
economic development; and 2) emphasis on strengthening land ownership. !
In relation to pillar one, the centrality of land to Uganda’s national development is clear in 
the vision of the Land Policy:  
“a transformed Ugandan society through optimal use and management of land 
resources for a prosperous and industrialized economy with a developed services 
sector [while the goal of the policy is] to ensure efficient, equitable and optimal 
utilization and management of Uganda’s land resources for poverty reduction, 
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wealth creation and overall socio-economic development” (Land Policy 
2013:2.2,2.3). 
 
In the Land Policy, it is stipulated that the Government of Uganda has a duty to attract private 
investment, both domestic and foreign, into productive sectors of the economy. This includes 
enabling a productive investment climate and facilitating investors’ access to land. Moreover, 
the framing of ‘optimal use and utilization’ of land resources refer to the government’s 
emphasis on efficient agricultural production. The government continuously favors 
agriculture rather than pastoral land usage (Mosebo 2015), seeking to make pastoral 
communities sedentarize and intensify agricultural-based livelihoods. A Karamoja-based 
foreigner working for an international NGO, in this regard, explained how the organization 
had to carry out agricultural-based projects in Karamoja partly to please the government, well 
knowing that the project is likely to fail due to the harsh climate conditions (NGO-
representative, Moroto, 28/01/16). The government has repeatedly referred to the ‘laziness’ 
of the Karimojong as an explanation for the poor level of agricultural production in the 
region. Janet Museveni, First Lady of Uganda – and up until recently Minister for Karamoja 
Affairs – have repeatedly proclaimed that pastoralism is a “social ill” that needs to be fought 
(Janet Museveni quoted in Ronald 2014:205). Her statements reflect a narrative that 
effectively marginalizes pastoralism as a livelihood and feeds into the historical 
representation of the region as backward and underdeveloped. !
The second pillar – strengthening land ownership – is closely connected to the efforts to 
boost national development. The Constitution and successive land legislation formally 
recognize customary tenure but simultaneously underline that this form of ownership is 
problematic for national development and that it needs to be secured and formalized (Land 
Policy 2013:38). The Land Policy criticizes customary tenure by stipulating that it “[...] does 
not provide security of tenure for landowners” (Land Policy 2013:38a) and that “[i]t impedes 
the advancement of land markets” (Land Policy 2013:38b). In Bacchi’s optic, the 
government’s problematization of customary tenure is that it provides low tenure security and 
that it hinders evolution of land markets; and indirectly national development. The Policy 
specifies that formalization of rights over land for indigenous people will leave communities 
less vulnerable to land grabbing (Land Policy 2013:IIB). !
As a solution to the proposed problems related to customary tenure, the Land Act provides 
for Certificates of Customary Ownership (CCO) (Land Act 1998:5). With documentation of 
ownership as the proposed solution, the represented problem is clearly the lack of 
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documentation of ownership. A person, family or community holding land can acquire a 
CCO, which can serve as documentation of customary ownership of land (Land Act 
1998:5:1). Communities holding land communally must form a Community Land 
Association (CLA), with nine executive members, to apply for a CCO (Land Act 1998:16). 
The government’s attitude towards customary tenure and CCOs, however, appears 
ambiguous. According to the Policy, CCOs “confer rights equivalent to freehold tenure” 
(Land Policy 2013:40). However, the policy also states that customary tenure is “regarded 
and treated as inferior in practice, to other forms of registered property rights, denying it 
opportunity for greater and deeper transformation” (Land Policy 2013:38i). It further 
stipulates that customary tenure is regarded as lesser in dispute resolution and to other tenure 
forms that have titles for proof of ownership, and that customary owners will never attain 
totality of the bundle of rights inherent in registered tenure forms before they convert into 
freehold (Land Policy 2013:38). In!spite!of!seeking!to!change!the!inferiority!of!customary!land! tenure,! customary tenure may be converted into freehold while the reverse is not 
possible. This substantiates compelling evidence of the favoring of individualized freehold 
tenure over customary land ownership. 
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPINNING THE PROBLEM REPRESENTATION 
The government’s problem representation of unproductive pastoral land use and 
undocumented customary tenure, as outlined above, are underpinned by certain 
presuppositions and assumptions. The following section unfolds the underlying premises 
underpinning this specific representation of the problem. !
For decades economists have consistently argued that clear and secure property rights are a 
precondition for vibrant economic growth (Joireman 2011). The prevailing belief among neo-
liberal scholars has been that customary tenure rights and institutions are inadequate to secure 
land tenure (de Soto 2000). Therefore, titling and privatization of property have been 
promoted as means to protect rights to land, which has resulted in a wave of neoliberal land 
reforms sweeping over the African continent (Boone 2007; van Leeuwen 2014). Hernando de 
Soto is one of the most influential advocates for the need to formalize and individualize 
African land tenure to generate growth and development. De Soto argues that the key to 
economic development in the West has been the establishment of a formal, comprehensive 
and accessible system of property rights documentation (Hunt 2004). From this view, land 
titling and registration of land in the Global South bear the potential to boost capital 
accumulation for the poor, as it enables mortgaging – brings ‘dead assets to life’ – which will 
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promote investments and increase productivity (de Soto 2000). In other words, the informal 
property rights of the majority – the poor – need to be incorporated into the formal legal 
system, which it is currently only the elites who gain benefits from.      !
The Land Act and the Land Policy are predominantly theoretically informed by the neo-
liberal, modernization paradigm with inspiration from IMF and World Bank’s approach to 
land tenure. Since the early 1990s, the Ugandan government has pursued policies that match 
the tenets of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Ronald 2014). The vision and goal behind the 
Land Policy shows the urge to make customary land into a tradable commodity to ensure a 
more efficient allocation of land, increase agricultural productivity, and achieve economic 
growth. In line with de Soto’s ideas of incorporating the informal property rights holders into 
the formal market-driven land system, the government of Uganda promotes the formation of 
CLAs and provision of CCOs as means to title customary ownership, which make customary 
land more readily available to the market. The government follows the logic that 
formalization of land rights will increase tenure security and encourage only responsible 
investment in underutilized land.!
CONTESTING THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF UNPRODUCTIVE AND INSECURE LAND TENURE 
The neo-liberal problematization of unproductive land use and insecure customary land 
tenure has been disseminated but also challenged numerous times by other interpretations of 
the land question. Old as well as recent studies of land titling have disproven the direct 
relationship between titling on one hand and investment and productivity on the other 
(Joireman 2011; van Leeuwen 2014; Mitchell 2005). Despite these findings, protection of 
property rights still tends to be equated with formalization of land tenure (Stein and 
Cunningham 2015). This rigidity underscores Bacchi’s argument that governments create 
problems with particular meanings and interpretations rather than reacting to them. The 
superiority of the neo-liberal interpretation, regardless the lack of compelling scientific proof, 
should according to Mosse (2004) be understood as a consequence of interest. The more 
interests that are tied to the neoliberal interpretation, the more stable and dominant this 
specific policy model becomes.!
Opponents of the neoliberal approach raise various arguments against titling, privatization 
and commercialized land markets. Most emphasize that these newly reformed systems of 
land in Sub-Saharan Africa have triggered intensified tension and competition over land and 
fuelled people’s incentives to invest in networks in the efforts to benefit in the rush to land 
(Berry 1993; Peters 2004). While proponents argue that formalization of land rights minimize 
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the risk of land grabbing through greater transparency, others argue that formalization 
directly facilitates land grabbing in order to free up land for investors (Stein and Cunningham 
2015). They criticize the neoliberals for silencing the hegemonic forces embedded in land 
markets in rural Africa, in their assumption that individual property rights enable people to 
determine how to best use of dispose of their property and that everyone can participate 
equally in land transaction processes. The existence of unequal power dynamics in market 
transactions transforms formalization from a protective force into an instrument of 
dispossession. As titling augments the ability to sell, it also opens up for a manifestation of 
the types of vulnerabilities, susceptibility and coercion that can lead to rapid landlessness and 
exacerbate struggles faced by the rural poor (ibid.). !
Formalizing informal tenure arrangements will be particularly harmful for disadvantaged 
groups that are placed outside the center of power, since formalization only recognizes 
primary rights (Peters 2004; Joireman 2011). The Western model of property rights regime is 
exclusive in nature and do not accommodate the complex range of secondary use and 
seasonal rights to the same property that exist within customary tenure regimes (see Chapter 
Four). Hence, a transition from communal ownership to a more exclusive form of land 
ownership carries the risk of dispossession and further marginalization of disadvantaged 
groups. Scholars have pinpointed that land liberalization and marketization produce ethnic 
tension and exacerbate existing inequalities (Berry 2002; Peters 2004), encourage distress 
sales of land (Baland et al. 1999), and that market prices of land typically come to exceed 
what local land-poor people can afford (Deininger and Feder 2001). These considerations 
have raised contestation about whether formalized individual rights are needed and even 
desirable in a Sub-Saharan Africa context. These dynamics are arguably relevant to consider 
in the case of Karamoja, where land is held communally and without formalized titles.!
5.1.2. RECOGNITION OF PASTORAL LAND RIGHTS: MINIMIZING LAND GRABBING? 
Based on the analysis above, the main body of land law and policy in contemporary Uganda 
appears to attempt to reconcile aspects from the neoliberal as well as the neo-traditional 
perspective. Customary tenure and its institutions are given statutory recognition and 
jurisdiction, however the ultimate aim remains to transform customary land into individually 
owned estates and commercialized commodities in a market-driven land system. This 
paradoxical dichotomy was reflected in several interviews:  
“There are two contrasting principles in the legislation. On one hand community 
land is held in trust for the next generation and is not for sale. On the other hand, 
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it is stipulated that land must be a marketable asset” (NGO-representative, 
Kampala, 23/02/16). 
 
It is evident that ideological battles are fought in land legislation between different problem 
interpretations of the land question and how to secure tenure. The neoliberal paradigm, 
inspired by de Soto, stands out as the dominant and stable interpretation of what the desirable 
form of land tenure is. It would be relatively easy to assume that Uganda’s neoliberal policies 
facilitate land grabs and dispossession in Karamoja, but this diagnosis has too often been 
given in land-grab literature without careful and detailed analysis (Pedersen 2016). Despite 
having strong neo-liberal connotations, the legislative frameworks and the proposed CCOs do 
represent valuable opportunities for customary landowners to achieve rights and agency to 
resist adverse impacts of land and resource investments. !
5.2. OVERLAPPING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LEGAL POWERS TO RETAIN LAND 
The formalization of customary land rights has given customary pastoral communities legal 
recognition as lawful owners of their land. This implies that they de jure possess the right to 
use, control, and transfer land as they wish. Formalization, however, also alters the nature of 
the control of land possessed by pastoralists (Stein and Cunningham 2015). The following 
sub-sections show how legal mechanisms in Ugandan land law and policy, and the existence 
of distinct and overlapping property rights regimes, enable the state to retain control over the 
land resources that pastoral communities presume as theirs.!
5.2.1. APPROPRIATION OF PASTORAL LAND IN THE NAME OF ‘PUBLIC INTEREST’ 
The 1995 Constitution vests all land in the people under the four tenure systems in Uganda 
but also elaborates that land held under any of the private tenure forms may be acquired by 
the central or district government if deemed in public interest (Constitution 1995:237:2a). 
This compulsory acquisition of land is based on the principle that under certain circumstances 
individual rights may be sacrificed for the greater good. Delving deeper into the specifics of 
this legal leeway, pastoralists’ procedural rights are guaranteed by the Land Act, stating that 
pastoralist cannot be evicted from land under any circumstances without being adequately 
compensated, or compensated and resettled prior to eviction (Ronald 2014). Customary 
landowners are, in this context, to be compensated according to the open market value of 
their unimproved land. The Constitution endows the government with power to limit 
undesirable land use in the interest of public welfare and/or orderly development without 
revoking ownership interests or rights (Constitution 1995:242,245). These legal mechanisms 
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endow the government with legal power to overrule pastoral land ownership, allocate land for 
other purposes than pastoral usage, and/or to control and regulate pastoralists’ land usage. If 
these legal powers are not used responsibly and in the public interest, such policy rhetoric can 
be used to legitimize state-led land theft and delegitimize pastoral land claims (Wily 2012). 
Such compulsory acquisitions are not a new phenomenon in Karamoja, as shown in Chapter 
Four.!
5.2.2. OVERLAPPING PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES 
Property rights of customary landholders are not exclusively rooted in the Land Act (1998) 
and the Land Policy (2013) but also pertain to policies related to other sectors within the land 
field e.g. agriculture, mineral extraction, forests, and wildlife conservation. Therefore, when 
examining policy initiatives to secure pastoral tenure, it is pivotal to also include relevant 
policies stipulating property rights to other resources, which may interfere with pastoral land 
rights in Karamoja. As in most countries, the Ugandan government has established separate, 
distinct property rights regimes for land and high-value natural resources, such as oil, gas, 
minerals, and wildlife. These distinct property rights regimes are governed by different laws 
and administered by distinct public institutions on different administrative levels (Veit and 
Larsen 2013). The legal and institutional plurality of these property rights regimes effectively 
means that an individual or institution may legally hold the surface rights to a plot of land 
simultaneously to other entities holding the rights to the natural resources on or under the 
same plot of land. !
When examining overlapping rights regimes in Uganda’s law and policy, two useful 
distinctions can be drawn between private and public resource ownership and between high- 
and low-value resources. Veit and Larsen (2013) argue that ownership and management of 
high-value resources tend to be kept closer to the central state organ than ‘lower’ value 
resources. This is evident in Uganda, where minerals and other high-value resources 
connected to land are vested in the Government, and the management of rights and 
governance processes relating to minerals are primarily centralized through the 
Commissioner (for Geological Survey and Mines Department) and the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Development. In comparison, lower valued resources such as land is vested in 
the people, and the management of land has been decentralized to lower levels of 
administration (Constitution 1995). Similarly, water sources (Mining Act 2003:86), wildlife 
and fauna (Wildlife Act 1996:3:1), and conservation areas (Land Act 1998:45:1) are either 
property of or entrusted in the Government. As minerals, water sources, wildlife, and 
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conservation areas more often than not are found in places of human habitation, the chance of 
parallel, overlapping rights to ownership or use of land is likely; and often the case in 
Karamoja. Simply acknowledging the existence of overlapping property rights regimes, 
however, cannot adequately address the implications such legal pluralism produces. Veit and 
Larsen (2013) identify that rights to high-value resources, allocated by the government, tend 
to trump smallholders’ land surface rights, which stress the need to assess the hierarchical 
structures that property rights exist in, to understand who gains authorization and is enabled 
to overrule other rights.!
When rights overlaps, due to plurality of property rights regimes, a hierarchical organization 
of these determine which right is superior. These hierarchical orders of rights structure how 
struggles over land in Karamoja play out. The Mining Act clearly states that minerals are the 
property of the government regardless of the existence of other rights relating to land:!
“The entire property in and control of all minerals in, on or under, any land or 
waters in Uganda are and shall be vested in the Government, notwithstanding any 
right of ownership of or by any person in relation to any land in, on or under 
which any such minerals are found” (Mining Act 2003:3). 
!
Land with suspected minerals may be the lawful property of an individual, however, if the 
government suspects or discovers minerals, those very same property rights to land are 
inferior to the mineral property rights of the government (Constitution 1995:237:2,26:2). 
Lawful owners are as a result left with only surface rights – grazing and cultivation rights –
that may only be exercised if doing so does not interfere with mineral activities (Mining Act 
2003:80). The conflictual relationship between land surface rights and mineral rights was 
pointed out by a young man in Rupa sub-county: “The minerals go up to the government, and 
the land is for the people - but how can we benefit if our land is dug up and excavated?” 
(Male youth, Rupa, 04/02/16). The hierarchical order of rights, in this sense, has fundamental 
consequences for the relationship between actors at all levels of society, and that the central 
government has perfect legal means to recentralize land management and to retain control 
over pastoral lands from pastoral communities. This effectively means that the government, 
at all times, can alienate certain land rights and that it holds superior legal powers to allocate 
pastoral lands to other actors for non-pastoral land usages.!
5.3. SUB-CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the Ugandan government’s problematization of pastoral land 
tenure, which underpins its policy efforts to secure pastoral land rights. This was followed by 
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an analysis of overlapping property rights regimes and legal means of land appropriation, 
which determine the final distribution of legal power to control use and allocation of pastoral 
lands. Based on neoliberal assumptions, Uganda has formalized customary land rights to 
secure land rights and transform customary land into a tradable commodity readily available 
to the market. This will according to neo-liberal thinking prevent land grabbing, promote 
investment in ‘underutilized’ land, increase productivity in the land sector and stimulate 
national economic growth. Land grab literatures have often depicted market-friendly land 
reforms as tools, which dispossess the poor of their land. It would be relatively easy to 
assume that this is the case in Karamoja, but this diagnosis has too often been given in land-
grab literature without careful and detailed analysis of the dynamics that play out. Despite 
having strong neo-liberal connotations, the legislative frameworks and the proposed CCOs do 
represent valuable opportunities for customary landowners to achieve rights and agency to 
resist adverse impacts of land and resource investments. The government can, however, at all 
times reclaim certain rights given to the pastoralist communities, i.e. if the state identifies 
minerals under the land surface, or if they decide to carry out development activities that can 
be classified as of ‘public interest’. Property rights regimes to high-value resources and legal 
provisions for compulsory acquisition represent perfect legal means for the government to 
retain legal control over pastoral lands, which present a potential risk to pastoralists in 
Karamoja. The government favor agriculture and minerals in national development strategic 
plans, and state officials’ rhetoric tend to frame pastoral land use as unproductive, which raise 
concerns in regards to the Ugandan government’s will and ability to practically secure 
pastoral land rights in Karamoja.!! !
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6. THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION IN KARAMOJA 
“People yell 'land grab' all the time, but really, it is not. Really, they are just confused 
because minerals cannot be seen with your bare eyes and this causes great problems! 
People do not understand that the investors do not have ownership of the land when they 
explore for minerals. They do not understand that mining rights are very different from land 
ownership rights” (District official, Moroto, 15/02/16) 
!
This chapter explores how different actors and their interests in land affect implementation of 
pastoral land rights in Karamoja. The previous chapter dealt with de jure pastoral land rights, 
finding that ideological battles are indeed present in the formulation of policy. However, in 
developing countries policy formulation tends to be a relatively technocratic and donor-
driven process, which renders de facto implementation and realization of such rights the stage 
for fierce struggles over conflicts of interests (Thomas and Grindle 1990). This chapter is 
devoted to unfolding the black of box of the politics of implementation. This approach 
implies that, “even if the policy may be right, the implementation process is not entirely 
technocratic it is likely to be a political process that is affected by many actors and interests” 
(Kjær and Joughin 2010:5). The focus of this chapter is hence to look closer at the land-
related socio-political struggles between different actors in their attempts to access tangible 
and intangible benefits. The chapter explores how these power struggles affect 
implementation and enforcement of pastoral land rights, and vice versa how the lack of this 
implementation affects different actors’ ability to gain, maintain, and control access to land. 
In order to facilitate such investigation, the chapter employs Ribot and Peluso’s access 
framework (2003) to analyze the means, relations, and processes enabling actors’ access to 
land and resources in Karamoja.!
6.1. IDENTIFYING ACTORS AND THEIR USE OF MECHANISMS TO ACCESS LAND  
“Land grabbers are many here. Even the state is one of them. Then you have the elite 
Karimojong, they also grab land. Then you have the rich, who go to the commission and 
receives titles. And then there are investors. Much land has been gazetted for wildlife, 
military, and police barracks” (Elder, Rupa, 04/02/16) 
!
Implementation of land rights is a political process that is affected by many actors and 
interests. Mapping out the actors involved in the socio-political struggles over land in 
Karamoja is a complicated endeavor due to blurry and layered social landscapes where 
individuals possess multiple identities relating both directly and indirectly to the state, 
investors, and local communities in Karamoja. For analytical purposes, however, this analysis 
divides actors into three main categories; investors, state actors, and local Karimojong 
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communities. These actors, their interconnections, and their struggles to access land and 
control land access are relevant to the implementation of pastoral land rights in Karamoja. It 
is crucial to emphasize that these categories are rather artificial as great diversity exist within 
the three categories and actors often fall within more than one category.!
6.1.1. INVESTORS 
As elaborated in Chapter Four, land access in Karamoja is based on a combination of state 
laws and customary laws and is controlled by various state and non-state actors. When 
investors seek to gain access to land in Karamoja, they depend on people and institutions that 
control land access, as they have the ability to mediate others’ access (Ribot and Peluso 
2003). Investors in Karamoja include both domestic and foreign companies from countries 
such as Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, and India (Hinton et al. 2011; Human Rights Watch 2014). 
The types of acquisitions take many forms such as industrial parks, road construction, hotels, 
national parks for conservation and tourism, military fields, and mineral investments. Mining 
operations, in particular, were continuously brought forward by communities as a prominent 
challenge to their land rights and access to land. Hence, this chapter analyses the socio-
political struggles related to land and minerals access but also includes other types of 
investments.  !
GAINING LEGAL RIGHTS-BASED ACCESS THROUGH GOVERNMENT  
Property rights to land and land-bound resources are governed by distinct property regimes 
(see Chapter Five). Investors’ ability to obtain rights-based access to land is determined by 
who holds the de jure or de facto power to govern such access. Legal rights-based access to 
land – e.g. for purposes of building hotels or industrial parks – is governed by the 
decentralized land management system. In Karamoja, where most land is customary, 
legislation stipulates that customary landowners de jure control investors’ access to land. 
However, through the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), the government is involved in 
finding and acquiring land for investors. This is done to attract foreign investment and entails 
that investors can apply for land via the UIA, whom in turn identifies and buys the land in 
question before leasing it to the investor (Kjær 2013; Ronald 2014). The government can also 
overrule the access control of customary owners if it decides to expropriate land for what it 
classifies as common good. This includes the extraction of minerals, as minerals are vested in 
the government (see Chapter Five). The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development is 
hence a key player in mediating investors’ ability to gain access to minerals in Karamoja. The 
district and local landowners are, however, given certain powers to mediate investors’ ability 
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to gain access, stipulated in the Mineral Act and Mining Regulations. When an investor has 
obtained prospecting license from the Ministry, the legal procedure brings investors to district 
level, where the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) grants permission to carry out activities 
(Mining Act 2003:II). Ultimately, this means that investors’ ability to gain access land and 
minerals is to a greater extent determined by, and mediated through, government institutions 
rather than the communities – who in land questions should be the lawful owners and holders 
of control. Unsurprisingly, this overlap in legal control of access leads to disputes. !
During the field research period, communities and state officials at lower administrative 
levels showed frustration over investors prospecting or exploring for minerals rarely making 
efforts to inform or obtain consent from them. As one government official on sub-county 
level said:!
“Investors do not go through the sub county chief. They come with licenses from 
Entebbe and go straight to the plot of land without talking to the communities. 
They disrespect all our procedures. We are never informed about their stay” 
(Sub-county official, Rupa, 04/02/16). 
!
Similarly a member of the Area Land Committee stated that, “investors bypass us 
completely! They only pass the CAO and he is not friendly to people here. He just signs and 
the investor goes” (Elder, Nadunget, 08/02/16). Evident in statements like the two just 
mentioned is a perception that investors bypass and disrespect the procedures in place for 
investors to get access to land and minerals. However, in terms of statutory law, investors do 
follow the stipulated legal procedure, as there is no requirement of consultation with lower 
levels of administration or the communities for mineral exploration or prospecting licenses 
(Mineral Act 2003; CCSI n.d.). In Ribot and Peluso’s optic, this shows an important 
discrepancy between legal access sanctioned by statutory law and legal access sanctioned by 
customary law. What is deemed as legal access in statutory law is not necessarily socially 
accepted and recognized by customary institutions and communities (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
This situation of conflictual laws and social rules results in communities incorrectly 
perceiving investors to be prospecting or exploring on illegal grounds without their knowing 
and consent. A common feature expressed in many of the interviews conducted during field 
research was that investors were coming “from above [government]” or “from Entebbe”. This 
reveals both how the central government plays a significant role in resource access in the 
region, and notably how land deals are frequently happening without free, prior, and 
informed consent of communities. !
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GAINING SURFACE RIGHTS THROUGH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ELDERS  
If investors want to obtain an actual mining lease, after having prospected and explored for 
minerals, they are obliged by law to acquire surface rights from the customary owners of the 
particular land in question (Mining Act 2003:43:3h). In this phase, an investor’s ability to 
gain and maintain access to land in Karamoja depends on good relations to lower-level state 
officials, elites, and traditional authorities. Our research suggests that the process of obtaining 
surface rights is characterized by calculation and deception, often structured around the 
cooperation with, or exploitation of, a few selected elders: !
“The investors need to show agreement of surface rights with the communities [...] 
the investors show no serious care to these people. They take them to Kampala, 
make them happy with plenty of airtime and alcohol and – boom – the deal is 
done!” (District official, Moroto, 12/02/16). 
!
This reporting of exploitation was repeatedly flagged up by state and non-state interviewees 
and resonates with the findings of e.g. Ronald (2014) and Tebanyang et al. (2015). Many of 
the interviewees explained how a few poor and illiterate elders were persuaded or cheated 
into putting their thumbprint on a document after receiving gifts and alcohol. Furthermore, 
allegations of investors making false promises to acquire surface rights were rampant. 
Investors are typically outsiders who “use middlemen, who survive on commission, to 
penetrate” (NGO-representative, Moroto, 01/02/16). These middlemen, or brokers, are 
generally Karimojong local government officials or local elites, whose role is to talk 
communities into accepting the land deals. The use of middlemen is favorable for investors as 
Karimojong communities tend to be very skeptic towards outsiders (Otim and Charles 2014), 
and shows the inequality in the actors ‘bundles of powers’. One interview with a high-
ranking district official revealed that the district is aware of the often deceitful ways, in which 
investors gained surface rights from the pastoral communities. However, the district is not 
able to prevent this from happening, notably due to the difficulties of working with the 
gerontocratic customary system. !
“In terms of mining lease they [investors] have to obtain evidence that they have 
received surface rights, but we cannot control how they obtain this. The investors 
would typically pick five elders and bring them to Kampala to make an 
agreement. Off course investors want to cut costs. This is pure business! But it is 
not our problem if a community meeting is not held afterwards and if the money 
and information is not distributed to the rest of the community”  (District official, 
Moroto, 11/02/16).!
Approaching land acquisitions from an exclusively business-oriented perspective serves to 
legitimize that the district does not intervene in land deals potentially detrimental to 
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communities. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that investors due face many 
challenges in their attempts to gain access. As Kjær notes: “although the government tries to 
help investors through a one-stop shop in the Uganda Investment Authority, in reality 
investment is not easy and there are lots of bureaucratic obstacles” (Kjær 2013:15). Other 
challenges include not being able to identify the rightful owners of the land under question, 
and that the communities sometimes fail to share information on land deals internally. This is 
highlighted in statements made by a representative of the marble mining company DAO 
Africa Ltd. who calls identifying the right landowners in Karamoja a “nightmare”, leading 
the company to only “identify the most prominent claimants” in its efforts to avoid conflicts 
over the land (Spokesperson of DAO Ltd., as cited in Otim and Charles 2014:16).     
Investors must navigate through layers of bureaucracy using their access to financial capital 
to smoothen powerful actors in return for access to land. The many conflictual allegations 
brought forward during the field research period made it difficult to navigate between what 
information was accurate and verifiable, and what was not. Yet, it is clear that investors’ 
social relations to – and use of – elite community members, access to authorities on multiple 
levels of government, and access to capital, serve as key mechanisms of access to land and 
minerals. Practices on the ground may, in this sense, differ from what is intended in policy. 
While not proving illegal misconduct, the complex legal systems of land access, together 
with the challenges of the traditional governance and tenure systems, make the process of 
acquiring land a messy business. Investors naturally go through the channels that are most 
likely to grant them access to the resources that they are interested in. Ultimately, this affects 
the implementation of land rights in the area as investors can be expected to work to ensure 
that their current access-channels remain open. !
6.1.2. STATE ACTORS 
“There is a general lack of clarity of who gets benefits from land deals. People look at the 
companies, but I believe we should look at the government. They are the ones, who allow 
them to come. The arrangements have already been done when they arrive” 
(NGO-representative, Kampala, 23/02/16) !
The role of state actors in mediating land access for investors has been largely neglected by 
much land grab literature, which tend to showcase land grabbing as a two-party struggle 
between investors on one side and local communities on the other (Wily 2012). However, the 
state is inevitably important, as it is the superior rights holder and can legally regulate access. 
Thus, as argued in Chapter Three, it is pivotal to unbundle the state to be able to see the 
different actors working at different levels within the ‘state’ apparatus (Wolford et al. 2013). 
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The following section explores the motives of different sets of actors who collectively 
constitute the state, and their relation to the implementation of pastoral land rights.!
PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND LAND SPECULATION      
In Uganda, Booth et al. (2014) observe that political leaders have used their positions in 
government to acquire or invest in land. Our interviews and general observations in and 
around Moroto town showed a clear testimony that people with political power had been first 
movers in the rush for land in the region. Notably, actors on all administrative levels seem to 
have embraced a role as land speculators that “go and process land documents when they see 
opportunities” (NGO-representative, Moroto, 28/01/16). One land dispute, well documented 
by Tebanyang et al. (2015), showcases this dynamic. The dispute, involving the land of 
Kautakou village in Napak district, includes a Karimojong elite working as acting Assistant 
Commissioner at the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Uganda Investment Authority. The 
land in Kautakou was titled to the Assistant Commissioner in 2010, when people were still 
resettling on the land after having been displaced during the years of insecurity. According to 
the community the land has never been sold, or was done so fraudulently by making elders 
sign documents that they did not understand due to illiteracy and deceit (Tebanyang et al. 
2015:15p). The case exemplifies how state officials and elites are able to utilize their power 
and position to access information on investment opportunities and to obtain full ownership 
of customary land for petty money in order to resell it and make a profit. These findings 
resonate with red flags identified in NGO reports (i.e. Kabiswa et al. 2014), in their 
accusations of the government scheming with mining companies to stealthily survey land 
behind the backs of communities.!
Another example of elite capture by state officials on the basis of privileged access to 
information took place in 2002, after Parliament approved degazettement of 54 percent of the 
land previously gazetted for wildlife conservation in Karamoja. According to Rugadya et al.  
there was a widespread lack of dissemination of information of the degazettement to the 
communities and “[i]nstead enclaves of information emerged within the elite and political 
leadership, by means of which personal interests and rewards were being secured and 
protected” (Rugadya et al. 2010:iv). Essentially, the communities already living on these 
lands lost the opportunity to reclaim what they believed to be rightfully theirs due to 
information only being available to government and government agencies. This highlights 
why at least some factions of state actors may obscure or work against implementing pastoral 
land rights, which could limit these factions ability to profit from land in Karamoja.    !
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COERCION, UNCLARITY, AND POOR INFORMATION FLOWS 
In Moroto, the sight of trucks leaving filled with rocks and coming back empty is an 
everyday occurrence. Yet, it is difficult to visit the mining sites and to obtain information of 
the actual economy of mineral extraction in the region. This is inevitably important to 
consider when investigating the motives and interests of different actors.!
Numerous interviewees pointed out that 
there are no weighbridges in Karamoja. The 
quantities of raw materials leaving the 
region are therefore unknown. There are 
conflicting numbers in terms of the spatial 
magnitude of minerals licenses and leases, 
but a map, produced by the Department of 
Geological Survey and Mines (2013), shows 
that as of 2013 most of the land in Karamoja 
was either licensed out (for prospecting, 
exploration, location, etc.) or under 
application (see appendix 8). The map 
suggests that the rights to access and 
perform mining activities are granted to 
investors – considerably more than the 
previously reported 62 percent (Kabiswa et 
al. 2014). The customary landowners of land that has already been licensed out, but where 
companies have not arrived yet, have allegedly not been informed: “Other companies have 
not come yet. They come in intervals. Much of this land has already been taken by investors, 
but the communities still do not know” (Sub-county official, Rupa, 16/02/16). The Mineral 
Act (section 98) stipulates that royalties shall be distributed to central government (80%), 
district local government (10%), sub-county local government (7%) and the lawful occupants 
(3%), based on 3% for precious and base metals and 5% for precious stones. The amount of 
royalties depends on the numbers filed by the licensee, and the Department of Mines “does 
not have any other technical way of determining this value” (Rugadya et al. 2010:18). 
District and sub-county officials in the region expressed frustration with the limited 
information they receive of the actual output of mineral extraction. A district official 
expressed his frustration with the centralized mineral governance system: “Decentralization is 
PICTURE: 
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not complete. Central government almost handles everything. Karamoja should be handled in 
Karamoja. Records of the extraction of resources should be kept here and not by central 
government” (District official, Moroto, 15/02/16). The customary landowners equally 
expressed frustration with allegedly not receiving royalties. When taking action to get what 
they were entitled to, police and the military coerced them. A young man in Rupa described 
what he was told, when he went to the district to ask for help: “He told me that the investor 
will only be there for 21 years. He said, ‘if you refuse these investors, you will shed blood on 
this land’” (Male youth, Rupa, 04/02/16). This form of coercion seemingly permeated land 
struggles in the mineral-rich areas of Karamoja. !
The lack of revenue and the coercive measures used against customary landowners have 
further stimulated the Karimojong’s conception of the government as predatory, which dates 
back to colonial times. Another male youth man rhetorically asked: “Were we disarmed to 
make peace, or to deprive us of our land?” (Male youth, Rupa, 04/02/16), underlining how 
some Karimojong perceive the government and its agenda for involvement in Karamoja.!
6.1.3. KARIMOJONG COMMUNITIES 
This thesis argues that power struggles related to land affect de facto implementation of land 
rights and vice versa that implementation of land rights (or the lack thereof) affects struggles 
over land as it conditions various actors’ ability to gain, maintain and control access to land. 
For the Karimojong communities these processes are of dire importance as they are the ones 
who face potential dispossession and risk losing their ability to maintain and control access to 
land. To understand how and why communities react when investors come in and seek to 
acquire land, one must keep in mind the dispossession and deprivation that the region’s 
population has been through for centuries (see Chapter Four). When referring to the 
communities of Karamoja, it is important to emphasize that these cannot and should not be 
seen as a homogenous group. Actors within communities do not possess the same bundle of 
powers given that hierarchical structures exist even within the ‘Karimojong’. Hence, the 
following analysis does not only examine how communities struggle with other actors, but 
also the struggles related to land taking place within communities in the region.  
A PROBLEMATIC TENURE SYSTEM AND ISSUES OF FORMALIZING TENURE 
As mentioned previously, state officials and investors often deal with a few selected elders 
when seeking to acquire land. This has to do with the patriarchal and gerontocratic nature of 
the traditional governance system of the Karimojong (see Chapter Four). During our field 
research, district state officials argued that the deception in land deals was not between 
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investors and communities but within the communities themselves. Elders’ social position as 
customary leaders places them in a privileged position in terms of land and resource 
investments, and, allegedly, will silently keep money for themselves instead of distributing it 
among the community. The rest of the community will consequently think that they have 
never been paid. The young men interviewed believed that “elder, women, youth and officials 
should be present when investors make deals with the community” (Male youth, Rupa, 
04/02/16), as this will reduce the risk of elders making bad decisions or seizing benefits for 
personal gain. This may be salient, and Fairbairn (2013) notes that evidence suggests that 
land deals are often endorsed and authorized by traditional authorities that, in turn, sometimes 
benefit from these deals. Land deals in Karamoja can similarly be partly described according 
to abuse of power by elders, suggesting that inequalities of power within the communities 
help drive forward land acquisitions in the region.!
New dynamics of marketization of land, the influx of investors, combined with customary 
leaders or educated elites reaping benefits for personal gain have rendered communal tenure 
in Karamoja vulnerable. As argued in Chapter Five, land reform initiatives in Uganda can 
generally be seen as an attempt to formalize land tenure with the aim of turning customary 
land into a marketable commodity. Arguably, as unequal power balances exist within land 
markets, formalization has the potential to become a means dispossession rather than a 
preventative measure. This formalization, causing dispossession, should not only be 
understood as the physical dispossession of land but also as the dispossession of certain rights 
to land (Stein and Cunningham 2015). This chapter, as well as Chapter Five, has so far shown 
how the state ultimately – as a result of the overlapping and contradictory property rights – 
ends up with the controlling power over access to land. In the case of Karamoja, this control 
of power creates an environment where those with political influence and traditional authority 
have the ability to have their claims on the benefits of land met at the expense of 
communities. In essence, the Karimojong pastoralists still possess the land but the issues 
stemming from the process of formalization alter the nature of how land access is controlled.!
COMMUNITY RESISTANCE 
Left with limited means of defending their access to land, communities in Karamoja find few 
other options than symbolic and physical resistance, which underscores the need to view 
pastoral land rights and access less like negotiations and more like hard fought struggles. 
According to our field research, community resistance in Karamoja ranges from peaceful 
demonstrations, destruction of demarcation stones, placing logs on the road, occupying 
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disputed land to spite investors, and onto more violent uprisings, chasing investors off with 
pangas and small arms. The peaceful ways of resistance have in some cases succeeded in 
driving off investors but have in most cases proven unsuccessful. Through their connections 
to government officials, investors are often empowered by their relations to the police or 
military personnel. Many officials and Karimojong NGO workers expressed concern that the 
growing frustration and anger among the Karimojong communities could trigger renewed 
conflict in the region. Echoing what many interviewees told us, an NGO worker said: “People 
have started to acquire guns again, because they do not feel safe on their lands” (NGO-
representative, Moroto, 27/01/16). A customary leader in Nadunget pointed out the 
importance of land access, stating that the communities’ willingness to fight for it: “If the 
government does not do serious action, people will pick up guns [...] To them land is all that 
matters, so if no one helps, blood will be shed” (Sub-county level official, Moroto, 08/02/16). 
The disadvantaged position of the communities in land matters is a dynamic that needs to be 
taken serious. A justified concern may be that the result of the communities not being able to 
control or maintain their much needed land access, may be one of increased insecurity. 
Arguably, lack of enforced pastoral land rights and knowledge of rights coupled with 
different challenges related to legal pluralism create a system where investors and individuals 
within the elite and the government end up as the victors in the competition over access to 
land and minerals in Karamoja.  
6.2. SUB-CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined how investors seek to gain access to land in Karamoja. In this 
process, investors’ rely heavily on government institutions and key individuals, as these are 
the de facto controllers of land access. The ability to control access to land is hence 
‘alienated’ from the local communities. This is the result of access-control being rooted in the 
current policy environment, with legal overlaps of property rights favoring the government, 
as well as the unequal ‘bundles of powers’ possessed by state and elite actors, giving them 
the ability to mediate others’ access. This chapter has illuminated that efforts to secure 
pastoral land rights are not implemented in a power vacuum and that land policies are likely 
to end up favoring elites including state officials and bureaucrats. In continuation of this 
argument, it has been shown how state actors at different levels use their position to obtain 
personal benefits from land and mineral deals. The same goes for individuals wielding 
traditional authority who have been active in authorizing land deals on behalf of communities 
who in turn are kept ignorant about the agreements reached. The implementation of pastoral 
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land rights in Karamoja is hence not unscathed by local realities. Rather, it is transformed in 
the interactions between various state and non-state actors where land policies are interpreted, 
activated, and implemented – or as in this case – not implemented. With the current lack of 
implementation and enforcement of pastoral land rights in Karamoja, the road is paved for 
powerful actors to secure personal benefits based on their ability to gain and control land 
access. This gives these actors little incentive to work to strengthen the rights of the region's 
pastoralist. Instead, efforts to secure pastoral land rights in Karamoja are so to say 
‘emasculated’10, and communities dispossessed of their ability to control and mediate access 
to the land they occupy.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Here used to describe how laws and policies to secure pastoral rights lose their virility. 
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7. LAND AND MINERALS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
“CCOs are not availed to the Karimojong [...] Maybe this is done deliberately by the 
government to deny Karimojong access to CCOs. Because, if people receive CCOs, the 
government could not keep on grabbing land” (Elder, Rupa, 04/02/16) 
!
This chapter links the findings of the previous three chapters to the political economy of land 
and minerals in Uganda. While the more transactional theories used so far have been 
productive in teasing out ways of understanding efforts to secure pastoral land rights in 
Karamoja and the motives affecting the implementation standstill, such theories have 
limitations. As argued so far, the implementation standstill is rooted in more than just local 
implementation struggles happening within a particular time and place. As indicated by the 
citation above, parts of the Karimojong communities are indeed aware that the 
implementation standstill in Karamoja may be connected to actors and interests beyond the 
local level. We therefore divert the analytical focus away from the in-practice micro-
processes of implementation of pastoral land rights in Karamoja and shift attention to how 
these processes are related to the broader structural forces at play. This is rooted in the belief 
that we cannot understand local processes of land claims and acquisitions without paying 
attention to how actors are influenced by interests at different scales (Wolford et al. 2013). In 
this chapter, we first engage in a discussion of the appropriateness of the applied theories and 
show how an analysis of Uganda’s ‘political settlement’ may help to expand and deepen our 
understanding of why efforts to secure pastoral land rights are not being implemented in 
Karamoja. Subsequently, an analysis follows, which uses ‘political settlement’ theory (Khan 
2010; Kjær 2015; Whitfield et al. 2015) to examine the latent power relations that determine 
the performance of policy efforts to secure pastoral land rights in Uganda. Structured around 
an investigation of the relative significance of land as a resource in Uganda’s political 
economy, we examine how policy implementation is connected to fragmentation of the ruling 
coalition in Uganda, its increasing need and use of patronage to maintain power, and, notably, 
how land may play a significant role in financing the ruling elite and its political survival.    !
7.1. LOOKING BACK TO SEE FORWARD: META-REFLECTIONS 
In the previous analytical chapters it has been established that Karamoja is in a fragile and 
transitional post-conflict situation where actors with competing interests struggle to access 
and control mineral-rich lands, customarily owned by pastoral communities.!
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Through the lens of property theorists (e.g. Berry 2002; Lund 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009), 
Chapter Four has examined how colonial powers and successive governments have directly 
and indirectly undermined pastoral land tenure arrangements and customary authorities as 
part of a state-building process. Chapter Five has applied Bacchi’s WPR-framework 
(2012a,b) and theoretical concepts by Mosse (2004) to examine the ambiguous nature of 
Ugandan land law and policy. As shown, neoliberal assumptions echo through this legislation 
in the promotion of titling of customary ownership. Yet, it is important to note that land law 
and policy, even in spite of lack of practical implementation, still provide de jure rights to 
communities, and access studies increasingly show communities gaining considerably more 
legal agency through formalized land legislation (as noted by Pedersen 2016). At the same 
time, de facto formalization of customary land rights, however, also potentially facilitate 
making customarily-owned pastoral land readily available to land markets in order to free, 
what the Ugandan government refers to as, ‘underused’ or ‘underutilized’ land for investors. 
In this regard, formalization of customary rights can become a means of dispossession, rather 
than offering protection due to the hegemonic forces embedded in land markets (Moyo 2007). 
Veit and Larsen’s explanation of overlapping rights regimes (2013) has been applied to 
illustrate how the rights of local land rights holders are trumped by the government’s rights to 
high-value resources such as minerals. Lastly, Chapter Six has applied Ribot and Peluso’s 
access framework (2003) to investigate the struggles and power dynamics between various 
actors in the strive for tangible or intangible benefits derived from land in Karamoja. The 
Karimojong pastoralists have been shown to have effectively lost their ability to control 
access to the land that they customarily own and occupy. Instead, government officials and 
powerful actors, such as community elders wielding traditional authority, are benefitting from 
the current arrangement, leaving them with little incentive to promote the implementation and 
enforcement of initiatives to strengthen pastoral communities’ rights to land.  !
Combined, the theoretical perspectives used to facilitate analyses of the first three analytical 
chapters provide a valuable understanding of processes behind the Ugandan government's 
formulation and implementation of land policy. These processes have triggered intensified 
tension and competition in the transactions taking place between more or less advantaged 
actors in the struggle for land in Karamoja. In this regard, the transactional approach of the 
previous three chapters limit the scope of the analysis by mainly looking at actors as isolated 
individuals with portfolios of power that can freely negotiate within the formal and informal 
transactions of land. Access theory has a general focus on the local level, and while Ribot and 
! 70 
Peluso (2003) do acknowledge that wider political and economic structures are important, 
they do not disclose much information on what this more practically entails. As argued in 
Chapter Three, states are key players in land deals and their role must therefore be 
considered. As Pedersen notes, the land grab literature has only recently begun focusing on 
local actors role in shaping access to land, while this has been a strong tradition within the 
access literature (Pedersen 2016). Building on these observations it is only natural to try and 
link the two. Following the argument that land tenure is deeply embedded in the political 
economy of land (Okuku 2006), we argue that the transactional perspective fails to 
encompass the wider structural restriction and conditions that shape actors’ economic and 
political behavior in regards to land. Taking this standpoint, this chapter employs a political 
economy perspective to facilitate a structural understanding of the power arrangements that 
underpin the emergence and performance of the institutions that have been put in place to 
implement and enforce customary pastoral rights in Karamoja. It also serves to take our 
grounded experiences from the field research conducted in Karamoja and link them to 
broader macro-level patterns of the political economy of land. !
7.2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND IN UGANDA  
The focal point of this thesis is on why the implementation of pastoral land rights has 
effectively come to a standstill in Karamoja, and what this entails for different actors. An 
immediate assumption would be that land reform should be desirable for most stakeholders, 
as tenure security provides the foundation for a legalized exploitation of land as a resource. 
Yet, reality may be much more complicated as the provision of land rights and tenure security 
is inextricably linked with the political economy of Uganda and the political survival of the 
ruling elite (Okuku 2006; Kjær 2015). !
7.2.1. THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF UGANDA  
Policy initiatives to secure pastoral land right in Uganda initially enjoyed political backing. 
The goal of these initiatives has been to secure optimal land use and agricultural development 
in a move towards socio-economic development and poverty eradication. Yet, as earlier 
argued in Chapter Four, the political backing of pastoral land seems to have diminished and 
its implementation has effectively come to a standstill. As Kjær (2015) notes, such processes 
of initial political support fading away have often superficially been explained as the result of 
lack of political will, weak institution, and as a result of the prevalence of patronage and 
corruption. A political settlement analysis, however, allows for a more thorough investigation 
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of such explanations and the issues pertaining to “the black box of political will” (Kjær 
2015:230) This facilitates more complex explanations of what may make some policy 
initiatives - in this case pastoral land rights – unrealizable in practice.    !
In Uganda the current political settlement is constituted by the ruling elite of President 
Museveni and his NRM party, who have been in power since 1986 at the end of the so-called 
‘bush war’. The year 2016 thus marks the 30th anniversary of the NRM party staying at the 
helm of Ugandan politics. Initially, Museveni and his NRM administration were applauded 
for delivering much needed peace and stability to the country (Barkan 2011), and the new 
government showed willingness to transform the country’s economy, and also embarked on a 
democratization process (Mwenda 2007). As the country actively complied with structural 
adjustment programs laid out by the IMF and the World Bank – and was able to show 
significant economic growth rates – Uganda became an African success story of how to 
stimulate growth and eradicate poverty during the first years of NRM rule (Mwenda 2007; 
Barkan 2011). However, these positive outlooks have since gone in reverse. Today, the 
regime stands accused of being increasingly entrenched with staying in power, adversely 
affecting its “ability to uphold good conditions for economic growth” and fostering an 
increased use of patronage and the emergence of competitive clientelism (Kjær 2015:230; 
Mwenda 2007; Barkan 2011; Asiimwe 2013; Booth et al. 2014; Whitfield et al. 2015).  
7.2.2. A STRONG DOMINANT PARTY RULE  
Initially, the NRM ruling coalition was based in a broad, albeit fragmented and mainly 
Southern-based, alliance between President Museveni’s guerrilla fighters and elites of the 
politically important Buganda Kingdoms. This alliance gave the new ruling elite enough 
support to overcome the challenge of maintaining a stable ruling coalition in a country 
otherwise marked by spatial-, ethnic-, and socio-economic- cleavages and fragmentations 
(Kjær 2015). The coalition constituted itself around a strong political elite who enjoyed broad 
support and legitimacy having brought peace to the country. Emphasis of the ruling elite was 
put on consolidating power, and the NRM coalition came to function as a ‘tent’, 
accommodating all the important political factions under a strong no-party/one-party 
dominant system (Mwenda 2007; Barkan 2011; Whitfield et al. 2015). The power and 
successful consolidation of the coalition was achieved partly through the introduction of the 
decentralized LC-governance system, penetrating all levels of society and restraining the 
power and authority of competing traditional organizations (Whitfield et al. 2015:170). 
Critics of the decentralization reform argue that the ruling elite created the LC-system only to 
! 72 
expand patronage networks into the countryside (Green 2010). The ruling coalition became 
characterized by the features ascribed to what Whitfield et al. calls a ‘Strong Dominant Party’ 
type (Whitfield et al. 2015:107,170), meaning that the ruling coalition, at least in theory, 
should have been stable enough to be able to formulate and implement vital growth-
enhancing strategies without any serious opposition to resist it. The Ugandan government 
has, however, not been able to facilitate such strong dominant party model (Kjær and 
Katusiimeh 2012). Following years of protracted civil war, the economy laid in ruins, and the 
country’s own ‘domestic capitalist’ were weak and few. Therefore the ruling elites came to 
rely on foreign aid to rebuild the country’s economy, in turn giving leeway for donors to 
exercise their influence on policies often along the lines of neoliberal ideas such as 
macroeconomic balances and market liberalizations (Whitfield et al. 2015). One such 
example - particular interesting to the topic of this thesis – has been the creation of the 1998 
Land Act, serving the purpose of making land a marketable commodity (Okuku 2006; see 
Chapter Five) at the expense of customary tenure recognition.  !
7.2.3. FRAGMENTATION OF THE RULING COALITION 
Over time the ruling coalition has increasingly fallen apart. Kjær (2015) notes that by 2012, 
the alliance between the Buganda elites and Museveni’s NRM ruling elite had broken down, 
shrinking the base of ruling elite, which in turn has come to rely increasingly more on 
Museveni’s own ethnic group. Exactly when the coalition started to fall apart is debatable, as 
the coalition already from the beginning was a loose alliance. However, literature generally 
agrees that a significant catalyst for this process was the introduction of regular elections in 
1996, and notably picking up pace with the introduction of multi-party elections in 2006 
(Barkan 2011; Kjær 2015; Whitfield et al. 2015). The introduction of elections has enhanced 
the importance of lower-level factions of the ruling coalition, e.g. local government officials, 
as they have become needed in the mobilization of votes. The LCs, which have evolved into 
administrative decentralized organs of state control, are used by the ruling elite in their 
political campaigns to secure votes. In this regard, decentralization expanded the bargaining 
power of the lower factions of the ruling coalition and has altered the distribution of power 
within the ruling coalition (Whitfield et al. 2015). The base of the ruling coalition has further 
narrowed given that factions outside the coalition have grown stronger, and elements within 
the NRM party is beginning to show resistance of Museveni, e.g. younger members of the 
party NRM party who were not part of the bush war (Kjær 2015). Arguably this has 
implications for the coalition's ability to implement and enforce policy. As lower factions of 
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the coalition grow more powerful, they become less controllable and can put more pressure 
on the ruling elite, who in turn must find alternative ways to stay in power.  !
Essentially, this decrease of political basis shows two important dynamics that must be kept 
in mind when trying to understand the (lack of) implementation of pastoral land rights in 
Karamoja. Firstly, it is important to note that as lower-level faction of the ruling elite have 
gained strength, they are likely to resist policies that potentially restrict the privileges they 
enjoy through the decentralized rent management system. Secondly, as the mobilization of 
votes is increasingly more important, there is a good chance that the ruling party may seek to 
promote policies that are either appealing to a large proportion of the public, or promote 
policies which deliver political funding and loyalty by pleasing important factions: !
“In particular, those individuals and groups who contribute to the ruling party 
may be rewarded through allocations of various benefits such as access to land. If 
sector-actors help fund the ruling NRM party, policies are more likely to benefit 
them” (Kjær 2015:232). 
!
It is in this light that we need to understand pastoral rights and their implementation, i.e. does 
the implementation impact negatively on the distribution of benefits to important supporters 
of the ruling elite? While the Karimojong pastoralists may not be particularly important to the 
financing of the survival of the ruling coalition, Karamoja does make up considerable 
political support with some districts in the region, such as Amudat and Napak, mounting up 
to 97.4 and 93.7 percent of voter support of Museveni in the 2016 elections (Electoral 
Commission 2016). In spite of not practically recognizing pastoral land rights, the assurance 
of this political backing, however, seems, at the moment, to be facilitated through catering to 
the lower factions of the ruling coalition (the LC-officials and investors) in Karamoja, where 
a prevailing notion persists that without Museveni’s ruling coalition, the region will fall back 
into unrest: “Museveni wants the Karimojong to give him another term […] if we do not vote 
for him, this place will descend back into chaos” (Female, Moroto, 27/01/16). Emphasis is 
thus given to meeting the interests of actors, such as investors and lower-level elites, who 
play a more direct role in keeping the ruling coalition in place. !
7.2.4. INFLATIONARY PATRONAGE: FUNDING THE RULING ELITE 
As argued by Khan (2010), political settlements ultimately shape how ruling elites behave 
and what policies they prioritize. The reaction of Museveni and the ruling elite, having lost 
their previous broad-based support, has been to increase the use of patronage in their quest 
for winning elections. This is i.e. done through allowing decentralized lower-level factions to 
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benefit from their positions, in what is here labeled ‘decentralized rent management’ (Kjær 
2015; Whitfield et al. 2015). Decentralized rent management allows lower-level faction to 
access the benefits of state resources, which are channeled through the districts – resulting in 
the finances needed to maintain the ruling coalition growing substantially. Barkan (2011) 
elaborates that government spending on patronage significantly increased between 2006 and 
2011, following the introduction of the multi-party system, “in which elements of democratic 
practice mask authoritarian and personal rule” (Barkan 2011:4). The rising costs of sustaining 
patron-client networks – as well as the need to stabilize a more and more fragmented ruling 
coalition – effectively create a situation of ‘inflationary patronage’ (ibid.). In this situation, 
political support must be bought through both formal and informal channels of financing. !
The ruling elite is highly dependent on its capacity to establish “formal and informal 
institutions (such as property rights or informal rules of redistribution) that create benefits in 
line with the relative power of powerful groups” (Khan 2010:20). Access to land, in this 
regard, has the potential to become a battleground linked to broader structural forces of 
political competition with ties that lies beyond the immediately visible struggles on the 
ground. A chronic capacity issue throughout the developing world, including Uganda, means 
that the government is not able to sustain its own political survival, by acquiring resources for 
redistribution to powerful groups, through formal channels alone:!
“A significant characteristic of developing countries is that their inherited 
distributions of power cannot be supported by the incomes generated by formal 
institutions alone. Informal institutions play a vitally important role in all 
developing countries because informal institutions are the only feasible 
mechanism for sustaining economic benefits for powerful groups who would 
otherwise have lost out” (Khan 2010:26). 
!
Low production and productivity indicate that the formal economy on its own cannot sustain 
the ruling coalition’s political survival. In spite of taxation reforms, Uganda has not been able 
to increase revenues significantly. Furthermore, development assistance, which has played a 
significant role in funding Museveni’s patronage, has been declining rapidly. In the budget 
year 2011 alone, development assistance dropped from 55 to 26 percent of the national 
budget. This was the result of corruption scandals and a general trend of decreasing aid (Kjær 
and Katusiimeh 2012; Whitfield et al. 2015). The lack of capacity of the formal economy to 
secure the status quo of the ruling coalition in Uganda is an important implication in 
assessing how the lack of implementation of securing and recognizing pastoral land rights 
facilitates its survival. In attaining informal funding of the survival of the ruling coalition, 
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land thereby plays an important role in meeting the needs of important political backers and 
facilitating their continued support. !
7.2.5. THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND AND MINERALS IN FUNDING THE RULING ELITE  
The control of land and natural resources such as oil, minerals, forestry, and wildlife 
represents the economic foundation in most African states (Moyo 2007) and largely 
determines the revenues and resource base that the ruling elite receives to fund the ruling 
coalition. In Uganda, power structures and politics are heavily influenced by control of land. 
Ruling elites generally pursue the easiest avenues for generating resources, such as foreign 
aid, agricultural commodity exports and not least extractive natural resources e.g. minerals 
and oil (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). As the cost of staying in power for the NRM 
regime has increased, while donors cut aid and revenues are stagnating or only slightly 
increasing, the ruling elite is searching for alternative sources of income (Kjær and 
Katusiimeh 2012). The discovery of oil in Uganda in 2006 has led to great expectations of oil 
as a source of future revenue. Revenues from oil can potentially replace aid in financing 
Uganda’s public budget but are likely to primarily fund the Museveni family’s continuous 
grasp on power. Early warnings of the ruling elite’s plan of using oil revenues to fund the 
‘cost’ of staying in power are undisclosed in ‘Production Sharing Agreements’ between the 
government and oil companies and in a proposed oil bill that vests considerable discretionary, 
centralized power to gain, maintain and control access to oil resources (Kjær and Katusiimeh 
2012). Falling oil prices, however, may suggest that revenue from oil is hardly guaranteed. 
Therefore, with oil prices dropping, along with rising costs of maintaining the ruling 
coalition, related to inflationary patronage, it is likely that the coalition of power in Uganda 
will tighten its grip on minerals to ensure the survival of the ruling elite. Between 1998 and 
2002 the mineral sector’s contribution to GDP grew at 8 percent per annum. From 2004 to 
2008, the sector on average grew by 13 percent per annum (Rugadya et al. 2010). The 
mineral sector is, like the oil sector, permeated by discretion and a general lack of 
transparency as outlined in Chapter Six. Minerals, and the centralized management of such, 
are kept close to the ruling elite’s power to control the revenue that are generated through 
mineral extraction, ensuring the ruling elite’s ability to use this revenue to pay for political 
support. The Mining Act stipulates that it is illegal for any government official to directly or 
indirectly acquire any right, share or interest in mining activities (Mining Act 
2003:17:1,17:2), but findings of this thesis suggests that the ruling elite and powerful factions 
of the coalition have shares in various land investments. This is supported by Booth et al. 
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(2014), who finds that politicians, military personnel, and investors, form collusive networks. 
They argue that investors exchange shares in their businesses or pay handsome amounts for 
‘facilitation’: i.e. assistance to smoothen or clear obstacles that may arise. In this way the 
President or ‘fixers’ such as local businessmen, politicians, relative or associates of the 
President or ruling elite smoothen the way for investors in return from funding the ruling 
coalition (Whitfield et al. 2015). As an example, Museveni’s half-brother, Salim Saleh, was a 
partner in the British firm, Branch Energy, responsible for the excavation for gold, when gold 
mining began in Karamoja in the 1980s (Mirzeler and Young 2000).  From a contemporary 
perspective, several links between the ruling elite – hereunder the First Family and Foreign 
Minister Sam Kuteesa – to prominent businesses are well founded (Kjær and Katusiimeh 
2012; Booth et al. 2014). This suggests that the ruling elite is heavily involved in business 
activities; using their offices to insert themselves into joint ventures with foreign investors or 
acquiring significant shares in businesses (Booth et al. 2014). While this in itself does not 
directly prove misconduct, it does showcase important examples of high value minerals being 
of vital importance to the ruling coalition.!
Pertaining to contemporary mining activities in Karamoja, the ruling elite is able to control 
access to the benefits of land and minerals beneath it since investors are dependent on their 
favors to access these resources. Lack of weighbridges, published mineral reports, denial of 
access to land being prospected-, explored-, and mined provides little transparency of the 
actual revenue produced through mining activities. Communities and lower levels of 
administration are left with little knowledge of the compensation or royalties they are legally 
entitled to receive. This allows money to flow through informal channels to directly support 
the ruling coalition. Our research has indicated that, in Karamoja, minerals make up both 
formal and informal (facilitated by the lack of transparency) channels of funding to the ruling 
coalition. Promoting the mineral sector, through the support of investors, economically 
endows the ruling elite and helps cement its power-holding position and pay off its patronage 
networks. In line with the argument made by Whitfield et al. (2015), this would give even 
greater incentive for the ruling elite to strengthen its relations within the ruling coalition to 
enforce policies and (lack of) implementation that advantage investors to extract minerals that 
benefit state revenues rather than securing pastoral land rights, which has key implications for 
the implementation standstill. The following section shows how a political settlement 
analysis may help explain why the protection of pastoral land rights in Karamoja has come to 
a standstill. !
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7.3. SECURING THE SURVIVAL OF THE RULING ELITE 
In this section, we argue that the political promotion of the mineral sector in Uganda is 
closely interlinked with the (lack of) implementation of local land rights in Karamoja. Where 
one individual or group may gain through access to land, another individual or group may 
lose out. The reason for new policies being contested is that they are often directly concerned 
with changing the rules of the game for distribution of resources in society. As Whitfield and 
Therkildsen (2011) assert:!
“The promotion and protection of [specific policies] in developing countries 
usually cannot take place without changing formal and/or informal institutions or 
rules of the game. Changing the distributive rules of the game is about favouring 
certain individuals, groups of people or industries over others” (Whitfield and 
Therkildsen 2011:20) 
!
We would argue that the ruling elite in Uganda prioritizes investments in the mining sector 
over indigenous peoples’ interests in Karamoja. Investors have been given a special status, 
above Ugandan citizens’ rights, and their interests have been shown to supersede the law of 
the territory (Ronald 2014). The reason behind this prioritization may be that the political 
elite has little incentive to support pastoralists and their land rights, as pastoralists are 
relatively insignificant to the survival of ruling elite neither as voters nor resource providers. 
Moreover, the fragmentation of the ruling elite organized in and around Museveni rule (Kjær 
2015) urges the ruling elite to concentrate on policies and initiatives that produce quick 
results and immediate rewards. From this perspective, solving Uganda’s land question 
requires long-term commitment, fitting poorly with the ruling elite’s preoccupation with 
short-term political survival. Instead the ruling elite may favor capitalist investors in the 
mineral sector and facilitate their access to land as they more effectively generate revenue 
that helps ensure the survival of the ruling elite:!
“Promoting a sector is more likely when it would mean gaining the support of 
important actors. Ruling elites will tend to support sectors when this helps to 
cement the ruling coalition or otherwise keep the ruling elites in power. More 
particularly, when economic entrepreneurs in a certain sector are important 
either because of their provision of government revenue or because they provide 
funding for the ruling party, ruling elites are likely to implement policies to favor 
their particular sector” (Kjær 2015:231).   
!
The ruling elite’s support of particular sectors within the bureaucratic governance system 
potentially allows for the generation of ‘pockets of efficiency’ (Whitfield et al. 2015). Such 
pockets of efficiency may materialize if there is political interest. The emergence of pockets 
of efficiency may be used to explain why some policies fail while others succeed. The 
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fundamental premise is that if implementation of a particular policy has great enough 
significance to the ruling elite, the ruling elite will work to ensure that “pockets of 
institutional and governance efficiency” is created (Hansen et al. 2014:4). In the case of 
Uganda, Kjær (2015) has shown how the dairy sector has emerged as a pocket of efficiency, 
whereas the agricultural and fisheries sectors in general remain largely unsuccessful in terms 
of economic transformation. The three sectors all had initial political backing by the President 
but backing warned off in regards to the latter two. The success of the dairy sector, Kjær 
writes, can be explained by two factors. One factor relates to many of the members of the 
NRM elite have personal interests in the sector. The other factor pertains to that promoting 
the dairy sector as a significant means to build a strong support base within the politically 
important Southwest of country. A pocket of efficiency thus arises when, “the relationship 
between ruling elites and the relevant industry actors is important for building and/or 
maintaining the coalition” (Kjær 2015:237). This was not the case for either the fisheries or 
the agricultural sectors in general but, as is evident in the next section, may have relevance 
when considering the ruling elite’s political and economic behavior in Karamoja relating to 
land and mineral investments.!
7.4. A POCKET OF IN-EFFICIENCY? 
Few, if any, sources make a direct link between mining activities in Karamoja and to what 
extent these provides important revenue and funding of the ruling elite. However, several of 
our interviews suggested that interests in the mining companies present in Karamoja reach all 
the way up to the ruling elite. In a conversation with a NGO representative about the central 
government’s involvement in mining deals in Karamoja, she explained that the ruling elite 
seeks to cover up their own involvement by inducing conflict in the local arena:!
“Wherever top government officials have interest there is conflict. They want 
rumors and fighting on the ground. You should investigate the government’s use 
of conflict to cover up the truths and facts so that no one can see how they are 
involved. The government is playing its citizens” (NGO-representative, Kampala, 
24/02/16). 
!
It is difficult to verify the allegations that mineral extraction is an important source of funding 
of the ruling elite. Booth et al (2014) points out that rumors of enterprise ownerships or 
business links to the ruling elite in Uganda are very difficult to confirm due to the use of 
proxies and effective disclosure of information from the Office of the Registrar-General. Yet, 
if the mineral sector resembles the oil sector in Uganda; benefits from and linked to the 
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mining activities in Karamoja are presumably completely ingrained in the political 
settlement. It can therefore be assumed that mineral extractions in Karamoja provide 
important revenue and funding for the ruling elite, which can be distributed to supporters and 
coalition partners. If they do, it is highly unlikely that the ruling elite will seek to turn the 
field of land policy implementation into a ‘pocket of efficiency’. Turning the field of land 
into a pocket of efficiency requires a significant degree of control over – and loyalty from – 
higher and lower-level factions of the ruling elite and the bureaucratic system. The 
implementation of land law could potentially hamper the ruling elite in attracting new 
investors. The government has already installed fiscal incentives for investors, introducing 
for example zero customs duty for all mining equipment (Rugadya et al. 2010). Furthermore 
the government has for important minerals and energy resources begun creating the 
foundation for creating ‘pockets of efficiency’ for the promotion of these sectors. Here the 
emergence of a well run, and fully equipped, Department of Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Department within the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (Kjær 
2013), and the central role that minerals have been given in Uganda’s Vision 2040 seems to 
imply political support of these sectors. Crucial in this context is that the ruling elite is likely 
to avoid implementing policies that disfavor important investors. In this case, implementing 
and enforcing pastoral land rights could hinder the development of the mineral sector as an 
important source of mineral rents. Human Rights Watch recently proclaimed that there are 
ample reasons to be concerned about the Ugandan government’s willingness and ability to 
protect human rights of indigenous groups in Karamoja as more companies arrive to mine. 
They bring attention to the government’s “massively accelerated licensing of companies to 
carry out exploration and mining operations”, while its ability and will to support affected 
communities seems not existing (Human Rights Watch 2014:16). It is therefore highly 
unlikely that the field of land policy will see the emergence of a pocket of efficiency taking 
care of the implementation of land law in Karamoja. Therefore the implementation and 
enforcement of pastoral land rights in Karamoja may come to constitute what we could call a 
local ‘pocket of inefficiency’. This label is appropriate not least given the limited staffing, 
few allocated resources, and exceptionally weak and slow implementation of customary 
pastoral rights that the Karamoja region has experienced, exemplified by the continuous lack 
of issued CCOs. This brings us back to the citation that initiated this chapter, which clearly 
shows that parts of the pastoralist communities in Karamoja are acutely aware of their rights 
and that the absence of implementation of CCOs may deliberately be kept away from them 
due to state actors’ interest in land and resource investments in the region. 
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The paradox in Karamoja is that mutual interests between actors in the mineral sector and the 
ruling coalition do not require efficiency, but rather the opposite. Powerful groups within the 
ruling coalition in Karamoja benefit directly and indirectly from the mineral sector and the 
window of opportunity that the condition of tenure insecurity in Karamoja represents. This 
suggests that factions of the coalition do not just lack political will. Rather, they have direct 
incentives for stalling and hindering the implementation of CCOs and pastoral land rights in 
general in order to maintain sources of funding for political survival. Many of the interviewed 
NGO-workers and lower-level officials said that CCOs are installed as a subject of discussion 
on the lower levels of government to show commitment to the public and international 
donors, but that the ruling elite and powerful members in the ruling coalition had no intention 
of ever implementing it.!
”The government wants good advertisement, so they talk about customary tenure 
and customary certificates on the LC3-level, but they do not take it any further. It 
is all strategies” (NGO-representative, Kampala, 25/01/16).  
!
Maintaining the standstill of implementation and enforcement of pastoral land right may – 
between these actors – therefore is of paramount importance. Promoting a land policy that 
advocates for greater customary land tenure security in Karamoja may in other words hurt the 
interest of these powerful groups and result in loss of privileges. As a result, the ruling 
coalition can be assumed to (in)formally resist the implementation of the land law, despite 
formally promoting the law, as the 2013 Land Policy may cause the ruling elite to lose 
support from important factions of the ruling coalition. De facto implementation of 
customary pastoral rights would transfer a greater share of the economic revenue from 
minerals in Karamoja to communities and official public funds. Consequently, less revenue 
would be channeled to investors and the ruling elite, who would be left with less capital to 
distribute to important lower-levels of the ruling coalition. Moreover, if ‘fixers’ from the 
lower levels of the ruling coalition can no longer help investors to circumvent costly and 
time-consuming bureaucratic hurdles, state revenues would be delayed while also damaging 
these factions currently benefitting from this arrangement. !
Strengthening the rights of communities to control investors’ access to minerals under their 
land (as they are entitled to in the Mining Act) would reduce powers of the ruling elite and 
their ability to control land access in exchange of formal and informal funds. The ruling elite 
would potentially lose the privileged position, where investors’ rely on them for favors. Thus 
implementation of pastoral land rights would secure less funding of the ruling elite, as it 
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would potentially close the window of opportunity that the ruling coalition currently feeds 
off. Karamoja further serves as an ‘easy’ target when it comes to not implementing legislative 
de jure recognition of pastoral land rights given lack of political voice of the region and a 
general discourse of Karamoja as underdeveloped, backwards, and unproductive (Mosebo 
2015). The vested interests of the ruling elite (and the ruling coalition) in the status quo make 
change problematic, which is a key factor in understanding the lack of implementation and 
enforcement of pastoral land rights. The continuous favoring of foreign investment over 
indigenous peoples’ interests is evident in political and economic behavior chronically 
working at the expense of the Karimojong; instead serving to sustain the ruling elite’s power-
holding position. In the words of Okuku: “The concerns for equity, justice and social change 
in land relations in Uganda were sacrificed at the altar of power politics and narrow class 
interests” (Okuku 2006:22). Localized struggles over land access in Karamoja may, in this 
sense, be viewed as only a piece in the larger puzzle of the ruling coalition’s political 
survival.   !
7.5. SUB-CONCLUSION 
This chapter has taken a first step towards a political economy perspective on how local 
processes of land acquisitions and policy implementation in Karamoja are related to broader 
structural forces. The overall argument has been that the distribution of power in the political 
settlement of Uganda has key implications for the implementation of policies to protect 
pastoral land rights. Our analysis has suggested that increasing instability and fragmentation 
of the ruling coalition, together with the introduction of multi-party elections, have resulted in 
an increase in the ruling elite’s spending on patronage. As the formal economy cannot sustain 
the survival of the ruling coalition, and development assistance continues to decrease, the 
ruling elite is on the lookout for alternative and quick sources of funding. In this regard, 
foreign direct investments and especially the mineral sector stand out as an important new 
sector for accessing easy funding to maintain the ruling coalition. Findings from this chapter, 
supported by the findings of Chapter Six, suggest that the ruling elite as well as upper 
factions of the ruling coalition have vested interests in the land and resource investments 
taking place in the region. Our research suggests that investors acquire access to land in 
Karamoja from the ruling elite in exchange of company shares or that significant economic 
payments are channeled to the ruling coalition outside the formal economy. These procedures 
seem to increasingly fund the ruling elite’s political survival but at the same time undermine 
initiatives for implementation of the land law that aims at a more long-term, equitable type of 
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national economic growth. The current situation of widespread tenure insecurity in Karamoja 
provides a valuable window of opportunity for the ruling elite to maintain this flow of 
funding and access to resources. The paradox is that it is the lack of implementation and 
enforcement of pastoral property rights that allow for this to take place. In this regard, the 
emergence of a ‘pocket of inefficiency’ is the result of the ruling elite’s mutual interests with 
investors (domestic as well as foreign) in maintaining pastoral tenure insecurity. 
Strengthening pastoral land rights is likely to secure less funding for the ruling elite and to 
negatively affect the distribution of benefits in line with the relative power of important 
actors within the ruling coalition. Implementation of pastoralists land rights may be too costly 
for the NRM regime, which already struggle to stay in power and, ultimately, this analysis 
suggests that policy efforts to protect pastoral land rights have been sacrificed at the altar of 
power politics and elite interests. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this thesis has been to investigate how we can understand why 
implementation of efforts to secure pastoral land rights comes to a standstill, and what 
consequences the absence of implementation has for different actors. In Uganda, customary 
land tenure has been formally recognized since the enactment of the 1998 Land Act, formally 
enabling pastoralists to own land communally through the establishment of Communal Land 
Associations and Certificates of Customary Ownership. However, to this date, in spite of the 
formation of at least 52 CLAs in Karamoja, not a single CCO has been approved by the 
central government. As a result, much of the land in Karamoja remains untitled, leaving 
communities vulnerable to land dispossession, exacerbated by a current influx of investors to 
the mineral-rich region. !
This thesis has sought to move beyond the immediately visible dynamics and practices of the 
so-called ‘land-grab’ phenomenon to see processes of land acquisitions in a broader 
perspective. Through six weeks of field-based research in Karamoja and extensive literature 
reviews, we propose that processes of implementation of land reform, as well as the dynamics 
of land and resource investments, are best analyzed through a combined use of perspectives 
from different traditions. By combining access and property theories – with their strong focus 
on local actors – in conjunction with land grab literature’s attention to the role of the state and 
the structural forces at play, a valuable framework emerges for understanding processes that 
govern access to land on multiple analytical levels. The combination of these approaches 
provides key insights into how local struggles over land access may indeed be linked to the 
authority of actors working at all levels, well beyond the local.!
The thesis has asserted that current dynamics of property rights and struggles over land in 
Karamoja must be seen in extension to a long history of land dispossession and 
marginalization by colonial and successive national governments, and its significant 
contribution to changes in authority. Land law and policy’s emphasis on land formalization 
has been shown as a potential means of dispossession; both in physical and symbolic terms. It 
does, however, also provide pastoral communities with legal rights that could potentially 
affect already changing dynamics of property rights and authority in the region. !
Our research in Karamoja has shown that investors’ access to land relies heavily on state and 
non-state elite actors, as unequal distribution of powers provides these actors with the ability 
to control and mediate others’ access to land. Land and resource investments in Karamoja 
have been suggested to be a messy business prone to rent seeking and elite capture where 
! 84 
powerful actors, at various administrative levels, use their advantageous positions and 
authority to obtain personal benefits. These findings illuminate the power struggles taking 
place in the absence of enforced pastoral property rights, and how efforts to secure these 
rights are not implemented in a power vacuum separate from local realities. Through a 
political settlement perspective, we suggest that these localized struggles for benefits from 
land acquisitions are linked to the broader political economy of land in Uganda, conditioned 
by the ruling elite’s efforts to secure resources and funding to support its political survival.!
Ultimately, in answering the research question of the thesis, we establish that the 
implementation standstill leaves Karamoja’s pastoralists vulnerable to land dispossession 
given practically unenforced property rights and weak bundles of power. We argue that lack 
of enforced property rights and land and resource investments in Karamoja are influenced by 
the ruling elite’s reliance on foreign investments, and the mineral sector in particular, to 
facilitate funding to maintain the ruling coalition. The situation of tenure insecurity in 
Karamoja enables relatively easy access to revenues generated from the region’s vast mineral 
deposits, and provides a valuable window of opportunity for the ruling elite to ensure its 
political survival. Thereby, there may be little incentive and economic gain in strengthening 
the land rights of the region's pastoralists. Lack of implementation and enforcement of 
pastoral property rights can, in this regard, be seen as a favorable pocket of inefficiency 
maintaining distribution of benefits in line with the relative power of important actors within 
the ruling coalition. In spite of formal political backing and policy commitment, 
implementation of pastoralists’ land rights can, in this sense, simply be too costly for the 
NRM regime who seems more committed to staying in power than bringing about long-term 
structural change.  
The arguments presented here show how the implementation of pastoral land rights within a 
limited spatial and temporal context, such as Karamoja, must be analyzed to capture 
important dynamics and links between actors at all levels. While all dynamics found in this 
thesis will not necessarily be the same elsewhere, we argue that the theoretical and 
methodological approach of this thesis may provide valuable contributions to how we may 
analyze and understand the implementation of land rights in general. When looking at land 
rights in the future, our research question has produced the general argument that 
implementation of indigenous peoples’ land rights is influenced by struggles fought between 
local, regional, national, and international actors, as land resources and their distribution is 
deeply ingrained in the national political economy.  
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